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Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) (2020 Transition): Difference between revisions
Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) (2020 Transition) (view source)
Revision as of 00:10, 21 December 2024
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(Extracted from files at Transition book#Department of Energy) |
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The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS) have jointly identified lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors in the Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (2019). The Energy Lifeline is among the most critical due to its role in enabling all other life-sustaining critical infrastructure sectors to function. Due to the interconnectivity of the grid, a cyberattack targeting energy infrastructure could be detrimental to multiple lifelines. Energy not only powers our nation’s military bases but it also provides an essential service to public health and safety by supplying power to civilian hospitals; prisons; cell towers; police and fire stations; water treatment facilities; gas station pumps; and other lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors. | The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS) have jointly identified lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors in the Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (2019). The Energy Lifeline is among the most critical due to its role in enabling all other life-sustaining critical infrastructure sectors to function. Due to the interconnectivity of the grid, a cyberattack targeting energy infrastructure could be detrimental to multiple lifelines. Energy not only powers our nation’s military bases but it also provides an essential service to public health and safety by supplying power to civilian hospitals; prisons; cell towers; police and fire stations; water treatment facilities; gas station pumps; and other lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors. | ||
''Section 215A of the Federal Power Act (FPA)'' gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to designate critical defense facilities (CDFs) located in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia that are critical to the defense of the U.S. and vulnerable to a disruption of electric supply provided to such facility by an external provider, and identify their associated electric infrastructure as defense critical electric infrastructure (DCEI). The Office of Electricity (OE) leads the Department of Energy’s (DOE) efforts to mitigate all man-made and natural threats to the energy system. As such, the Secretary of Energy has delegated the authority to designate CDFs and identify their associated DCEI to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity.< | ''Section 215A of the Federal Power Act (FPA)'' gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to designate critical defense facilities (CDFs) located in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia that are critical to the defense of the U.S. and vulnerable to a disruption of electric supply provided to such facility by an external provider, and identify their associated electric infrastructure as defense critical electric infrastructure (DCEI). The Office of Electricity (OE) leads the Department of Energy’s (DOE) efforts to mitigate all man-made and natural threats to the energy system. As such, the Secretary of Energy has delegated the authority to designate CDFs and identify their associated DCEI to the [[Assistant Secretary for Electricity]].<ref>See Delegation Order No. 00-001.00H and Redelegation Order No. 00-002.10E</ref> | ||
DOE aims to energy-assure priority operational plans for critical defense and security missions by enabling consistently resilient power and fuel supply. Department of Defense (DoD) mission assurance, and by extension U.S. national security, is exposed to risk both “inside” and “outside” defense installations. DoD has the authority to execute risk management “inside the fence” by ensuring on-base energy resilience and emergency generation; whereas, DOE has the authority to manage risk “outside the fence” in partnership with the electric power industry and others. DOE’s role is distinct from, complementary to, and in full support of the DoD mission – DOE refers to this role as ''energy assurance for mission assurance''. | DOE aims to energy-assure priority operational plans for critical defense and security missions by enabling consistently resilient power and fuel supply. Department of Defense (DoD) mission assurance, and by extension U.S. national security, is exposed to risk both “inside” and “outside” defense installations. DoD has the authority to execute risk management “inside the fence” by ensuring on-base energy resilience and emergency generation; whereas, DOE has the authority to manage risk “outside the fence” in partnership with the electric power industry and others. DOE’s role is distinct from, complementary to, and in full support of the DoD mission – DOE refers to this role as ''energy assurance for mission assurance''. | ||
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*Ongoing risk mitigation efforts within installations to support complementary or integrated energy assurance activities on both sides of the fence. | *Ongoing risk mitigation efforts within installations to support complementary or integrated energy assurance activities on both sides of the fence. | ||
*The extent to which mission assurance may rely on natural gas pipelines and delivered fuels in addition to electric infrastructure. | *The extent to which mission assurance may rely on natural gas pipelines and delivered fuels in addition to electric infrastructure. | ||
*Specific components, equipment, and systems that may present higher risk and therefore should receive priority attention. | *Specific components, equipment, and systems that may present higher risk and therefore should receive priority attention. | ||
*Other civilian infrastructure needed for mission assurance that requires power to function (e.g., communications, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems). | |||
*Other civilian infrastructure needed for mission assurance that requires power to function (e.g., communications, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems). | |||
===Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners=== | ===Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners=== | ||
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Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners, including: | Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners, including: | ||
* | *DOE Offices | ||
**[[Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response]] (CESER) | |||
**[[Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy]] (EERE) | |||
**[[Offices of Fossil Energy]] (FE) and others | |||
*CDF owners and operators; the utility industry and other DCEI owners and operators. | *CDF owners and operators; the utility industry and other DCEI owners and operators. | ||
*Security partners including DHS, the intelligence, and law enforcement communities. | *Security partners including DHS, the intelligence, and law enforcement communities. | ||
*Regional and federal energy reliability organizations including the [[North American Electric Reliability Corporation]] (NERC) and the [[Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]] (FERC). | |||
*Regional and federal energy reliability organizations including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). | |||
*State and local governments, to include utility regulators and State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) energy offices. | *State and local governments, to include utility regulators and State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) energy offices. | ||
*Technical assistance providers such as DOE’s national labs. | *Technical assistance providers such as DOE’s national labs. | ||
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*Implementation of Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System.” | *Implementation of Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System.” | ||
*Development of black start, load shedding, grid restoration, and operation activities protecting or restoring the reliability of DCEI. | *Development of black start, load shedding, grid restoration, and operation activities protecting or restoring the reliability of DCEI. | ||
*Coordination of cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and emergency response programs and activities led by CESER. | *Coordination of cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and emergency response programs and activities led by CESER. | ||
*Facilitation of technical support provided to federal agencies by EERE’s [[Federal Energy Management Program]]. | |||
*Facilitation of technical support provided to federal agencies by EERE’s Federal Energy Management Program. | *Development of the [[North American Energy Resilience Model]] (NAERM). | ||
*Creation of other capabilities in the areas of research, development, and demonstrations; modeling, analysis and exercises; direct technical assistance; education and information sharing; and others. | |||
*Development of the North American Energy Resilience Model (NAERM). | |||
*Creation of other capabilities in the areas of research, development, and demonstrations; modeling, analysis and exercises; direct technical assistance; education and information sharing; and others. | |||
====Coordination with the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), which report to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity; and hydropower projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through:==== | ====Coordination with the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), which report to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity; and hydropower projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through:==== | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
{{reflist}} | {{reflist}} | ||
[[Category:2020 Transition]] | [[Category:2020 Transition]] | ||