Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) (2020 Transition)

Book 2 - Issue Papers
Entire 2020 DOE Transition book As of October 2020

The protection of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) fulfills the Department of Energy (DOE) statutory and executive authorities and enables the Department and its public and private sector partners to address energy sector threats to:

1. national defense and security missions, and
2. the health and safety of American civilians

Summary

National security threats against the U.S. energy sector continue to intensify. Our Intelligence Community reports that adversaries are conducting sustained and increasingly sophisticated campaigns against American government and civilian targets and warns to anticipate a debilitating event, or even the devastation of a multiple-threat scenario.

Of particular concern is the threat posed by determined adversaries with advanced cyber and physical hybrid warfare capabilities. For example, Chinese military tactics include “system destruction warfare” designed to cripple an adversary by exploiting vulnerabilities in physical and digital infrastructure. Their goal is to exploit situational awareness capabilities such as satellites, communication systems, and other parts of the military’s “nervous system” that enable the “muscles” to project power and defend U.S. interests globally.

The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS) have jointly identified lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors in the Guide to Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (2019). The Energy Lifeline is among the most critical due to its role in enabling all other life-sustaining critical infrastructure sectors to function. Due to the interconnectivity of the grid, a cyberattack targeting energy infrastructure could be detrimental to multiple lifelines. Energy not only powers our nation’s military bases but it also provides an essential service to public health and safety by supplying power to civilian hospitals; prisons; cell towers; police and fire stations; water treatment facilities; gas station pumps; and other lifeline functions and critical infrastructure sectors.

Section 215A of the Federal Power Act (FPA) gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to designate critical defense facilities (CDFs) located in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia that are critical to the defense of the U.S. and vulnerable to a disruption of electric supply provided to such facility by an external provider, and identify their associated electric infrastructure as defense critical electric infrastructure (DCEI). The Office of Electricity (OE) leads the Department of Energy’s (DOE) efforts to mitigate all man-made and natural threats to the energy system. As such, the Secretary of Energy has delegated the authority to designate CDFs and identify their associated DCEI to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity.

DOE aims to energy-assure priority operational plans for critical defense and security missions by enabling consistently resilient power and fuel supply. Department of Defense (DoD) mission assurance, and by extension U.S. national security, is exposed to risk both “inside” and “outside” defense installations. DoD has the authority to execute risk management “inside the fence” by ensuring on-base energy resilience and emergency generation; whereas, DOE has the authority to manage risk “outside the fence” in partnership with the electric power industry and others. DOE’s role is distinct from, complementary to, and in full support of the DoD mission – DOE refers to this role as energy assurance for mission assurance.

Status

Maintaining and periodically revising, as necessary, a CDF list

Maintaining and periodically revising, as necessary, a CDF list on behalf of the Secretary of Energy and in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and informing the appropriate owners, users, or operators of infrastructure that may be DCEI.

Differentiating DCEI from the broader energy system and identifying project approaches and funding/financing resources to execute strategies and investments to harden and protect DCEI.

Reviewing needs

Reviewing needs for scoping how DCEI is identified or defined across the energy system (generation, transmission and distribution) including special consideration of:

• Ongoing risk mitigation efforts within installations to support complementary or integrated energy assurance activities on both sides of the fence.
• The extent to which mission assurance may rely on natural gas pipelines and delivered fuels in addition to electric infrastructure.
• Specific components, equipment, and systems that may present higher risk and therefore should receive priority attention.
• Other civilian infrastructure needed for mission assurance that requires power to function (e.g., communications, transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems).

Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners

Establishing coordination and collaboration mechanisms with key stakeholders and partners, including:

• DOE Offices
  • Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER)
  • Offices of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)
  • Offices of Fossil Energy (FE) and others
• CDF owners and operators; the utility industry and other DCEI owners and operators.
• Security partners including DHS, the intelligence, and law enforcement communities.
• Regional and federal energy reliability organizations including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
• State and local governments, to include utility regulators and State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT) energy offices.
• Technical assistance providers such as DOE’s national labs.

Conducting a comprehensive inventory of DOE and partner capabilities

Conducting a comprehensive inventory of DOE and partner capabilities that can be leveraged for DCEI program success including:

• Implementation of Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System.”
• Development of black start, load shedding, grid restoration, and operation activities protecting or restoring the reliability of DCEI.
• Coordination of cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and emergency response programs and activities led by CESER.
• Facilitation of technical support provided to federal agencies by EERE’s Federal Energy Management Program.
• Development of the North American Energy Resilience Model (NAERM).
• Creation of other capabilities in the areas of research, development, and demonstrations; modeling, analysis and exercises; direct technical assistance; education and information sharing; and others.

Coordination with the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs), which report to the Assistant Secretary for Electricity; and hydropower projects of the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through:

*Strengthening operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) cybersecurity and resilience.

*Pursuing mutually beneficial broadband infrastructure and energy technology investment and deployment opportunities for America’s rural communities, including exploring the feasibility of providing broadband internet services using PMA preexisting excess fiber optics infrastructure.

Guiding and supporting the development of decision support tools uniquely suited to respond to unpredictable and high-consequence resilience events

Guiding and supporting the development of decision support tools uniquely suited to respond to unpredictable and high-consequence resilience events. OE recognizes the critical role Lawrence Berkeley Lab’s Interruption Cost Estimate (ICE) Calculator plays in supporting grid reliability improvements based on customer value of lost load surveys. However, the lack of methods and approaches suitable for evaluating DCEI-related investment proposals remains a significant barrier to achieving energy assurance for mission assurance. In order to implement DCEI risk mitigation measures on the grid, electricity system decision-makers and their stakeholders will need methods to assess the full costs of unpredictable, widespread, long-duration outages and the benefits of improvements that can help avoid disastrous economic and societal consequences should DCEI be left vulnerable to cyber-attacks and other hazards.

DOE Leadership and Coordination

DOE is well-positioned to lead the DCEI initiative as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for energy under the framework established by the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. More specifically, DOE’s DCEI-related authorities as established in the FPA enable the identification of DCEI for the purposes of protection, hardening, and enhancement. In addition, Sections 215A and 202(c) of the FPA authorize DOE to order grid restoration and operation activities to meet the needs of a “grid security emergency,” including protecting or restoring “the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense critical electric infrastructure.” This authority, administered by OE for the Secretary of Energy, can support prioritizing and accelerating restoration of electricity service to CDFs and other critical assets in long-duration outages that could last weeks or months. In such extended blackouts, emergency power generators and fuel resupply operations for on-base electric systems are at increased risk. Sustaining and restoring electric service to these CDFs is therefore vital for national defense and security.

DOE has the mandate, expertise, and electric utility industry relationships to manage risk “outside the fence” of CDFs by leading efforts to harden energy supply paths for DCEI and other mission-critical assets on the grid using an energy assurance for mission assurance framework.

Major Decisions/Events

The President’s FY2021 budget request includes $1.65 million to support foundational technical analysis for the initial year of DOE’s DCEI program.