CargoAdmin, Bureaucrats, Moderators (CommentStreams), fileuploaders, Interface administrators, newuser, Push subscription managers, Suppressors, Administrators
5,230
edits
Special Operations Command: Difference between revisions
m
Text replacement - "R" to "R"
m (Text replacement - "Vietnam War" to "Vietnam War") |
m (Text replacement - "R" to "R") |
||
| Line 29: | Line 29: | ||
[[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]] | [[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]] | ||
By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ( | By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] (R-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}} | ||
At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} | At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} | ||