CargoAdmin, Bureaucrats, Moderators (CommentStreams), fileuploaders, Interface administrators, newuser, Push subscription managers, Suppressors, Administrators
2,298
edits
Enterprise Cybersecurity (2020 DOEl transition): Difference between revisions
Enterprise Cybersecurity (2020 DOEl transition) (view source)
Revision as of 00:42, 21 December 2024
, 21 December 2024no edit summary
(Extracted from files at Transition book#Department of Energy) |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 6: | Line 6: | ||
Protecting the information assets of the Department of Energy (DOE) is of vital importance to financial and national security posture. Due to the high concentration of advanced research, the responsibility for the transmission of 11% of the electricity for the United States, and the national security missions of the Department, DOE is constantly targeted by sophisticated nation- state adversaries. Additionally, DOE has statutory, sector-specific cybersecurity responsibility for the Energy Sector. This document is focused on the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) functions. CESER prepared a separate paper on DOE sector-specific cyber programs. | Protecting the information assets of the Department of Energy (DOE) is of vital importance to financial and national security posture. Due to the high concentration of advanced research, the responsibility for the transmission of 11% of the electricity for the United States, and the national security missions of the Department, DOE is constantly targeted by sophisticated nation- state adversaries. Additionally, DOE has statutory, sector-specific cybersecurity responsibility for the Energy Sector. This document is focused on the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) functions. CESER prepared a separate paper on DOE sector-specific cyber programs. | ||
DOE is a complex agency both in the scope of its mission space and its unique organizational structure. DOE encompasses 17 National Laboratories and approximately 100 field installations across the country. The mission of the Department spans from open, collaborative research to maintaining the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. Given this extreme divergence in mission focus areas, cybersecurity postures and approaches are carefully tailored to provide appropriate risk management for each installation. The organizational structure of the Department adds to this complexity. Cybersecurity funding and authority is divided between the CIO and the program offices. The CIO is responsible for developing policy, performing oversight, and providing an enterprise wide incident response and coordination capability. Program offices such as Science (SC), Environmental Management (EM), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) directly fund the cybersecurity programs for their field elements at the National Laboratories, Power Marketing Authorities (PMAs), sites, and plants. In short, the CIO coordinates and oversees cybersecurity activities for the Department, and the program offices fund and execute DOE cybersecurity policies. | DOE is a complex agency both in the scope of its mission space and its unique organizational structure. DOE encompasses 17 National Laboratories and approximately 100 field installations across the country. The mission of the Department spans from open, collaborative research to maintaining the Nation’s nuclear stockpile. Given this extreme divergence in mission focus areas, cybersecurity postures and approaches are carefully tailored to provide appropriate risk management for each installation. The organizational structure of the Department adds to this complexity. Cybersecurity funding and authority is divided between the CIO and the program offices. The CIO is responsible for developing policy, performing oversight, and providing an enterprise wide incident response and coordination capability. Program offices such as [[Office of Science]] (SC), [[Office of Environmental Management]] (EM), and the [[National Nuclear Security Administration]] (NNSA) directly fund the cybersecurity programs for their field elements at the National Laboratories, Power Marketing Authorities (PMAs), sites, and plants. In short, the CIO coordinates and oversees cybersecurity activities for the Department, and the program offices fund and execute DOE cybersecurity policies. | ||
Creating policy and direction for such a large and diverse agency is extremely challenging. To ensure appropriate guidance on cybersecurity is promulgated, OCIO employs an open and collaborative development process for directives. This process is designed to capture and incorporate requirements from the multiple mission areas and provide appropriately tailored guidance for the complex. | Creating policy and direction for such a large and diverse agency is extremely challenging. To ensure appropriate guidance on cybersecurity is promulgated, OCIO employs an open and collaborative development process for directives. This process is designed to capture and incorporate requirements from the multiple mission areas and provide appropriately tailored guidance for the complex. | ||
| Line 31: | Line 31: | ||
=== Topic 1 === | === Topic 1 === | ||
In FY 2020, deployed Big Data Platform (BDP) as a central cloud-based repository for consolidating cybersecurity sensor data for cyber operations and analytics. In addition, the capability can be leveraged by other programs for their research if they have an approved plan. | In FY 2020, deployed [[Big Data Platform]] (BDP) as a central cloud-based repository for consolidating cybersecurity sensor data for cyber operations and analytics. In addition, the capability can be leveraged by other programs for their research if they have an approved plan. | ||
Continuing to deploy cybersecurity sensors as part of the federal Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding for expanding the licensing and integration of cybersecurity sensors was diverted to support a major shift to remote work in FY 2020. DOE anticipates continuing the deployment when DHS restores funding in FY 2021. | Continuing to deploy cybersecurity sensors as part of the federal Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. [[Department of Homeland Security]] (DHS) funding for expanding the licensing and integration of cybersecurity sensors was diverted to support a major shift to remote work in FY 2020. DOE anticipates continuing the deployment when DHS restores funding in FY 2021. | ||
=== Topic 2 === | === Topic 2 === | ||
* The Department is updating DOE Order 205.1C to address new threats. This process will take a year, and the process will include input from our Management and Operating (M&O) community, program offices, and other stakeholders. | * The Department is updating DOE Order 205.1C to address new threats. This process will take a year, and the process will include input from our Management and Operating (M&O) community, program offices, and other stakeholders. | ||
* At the end of FY 2020, the Control Systems Working Group (CSWG) was established to coordinate across programs to develop a strategy that includes asset inventory; vulnerability management and assessment; instrumentation; configuration; and alignment with ongoing processes and systems. This effort is not currently funded. | * At the end of FY 2020, the Control Systems Working Group (CSWG) was established to coordinate across programs to develop a strategy that includes asset inventory; vulnerability management and assessment; instrumentation; configuration; and alignment with ongoing processes and systems. This effort is not currently funded. | ||
* In FY 2021, DOE is developing a new policy to address national security systems at DOE. This effort is being led by the OCIO. The operators of these systems, NNSA and the Office of Intelligence (IN), will be critical partners in this process. | * In FY 2021, DOE is developing a new policy to address national security systems at DOE. This effort is being led by the OCIO. The operators of these systems, NNSA and the [[Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence|Office of Intelligence]] (IN), will be critical partners in this process. | ||
=== Topic 3 === | === Topic 3 === | ||
| Line 55: | Line 55: | ||
== Major Decision/Events == | == Major Decision/Events == | ||
DOE CyberFire and International Hackathon scheduled for FY 2021. The biannual training and hackathon allows DOE to develop technical workforce skills and partner with key international, federal, and industry partners. | DOE [[CyberFire]] and International Hackathon scheduled for FY 2021. The biannual training and hackathon allows DOE to develop technical workforce skills and partner with key international, federal, and industry partners. | ||