Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (2020 Presidential transition)

Book 3 - Organization Overview
Entire 2020 DOE Transition book As of October 2020

The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) is at the forefront of global efforts to deter and combat nuclear proliferation and prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. DNN leads the execution of NNSA’s “Mission Priority #2: Reduce global nuclear security threats and strengthen the nuclear enterprise,” and supports “Mission Priority #4: Strengthen key science, technology, and engineering capabilities.”

DNN develops and implements policy and technical solutions to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons or the proliferation sensitive materials, technology, and expertise necessary to develop nuclear and radiological weapons and programs. DNN achieves its mission by executing programs that:

Eliminate or remove nuclear and radioactive materials no longer in use and minimize the need for future use.
Safeguard nuclear materials and secure nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities in use.
Support forensics-based attribution of interdicted materials and devices, or of a nuclear/radiological attack, and respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security threats
Control the further spread of materials, technology, and expertise.
Detect and counter proliferation and verify that obligations are being met.

In pursuing these objectives, DNN has established a strong record of success. DNN has secured, removed, or eliminated nuclear and radioactive material from numerous countries around the globe; helped ensure the long-term sustainability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); supported a variety of interagency and other partners with cutting-edge technology to address proliferation risks; and prioritized initiatives to ensure that the highest levels of nonproliferation norms are at the foundation of global civil nuclear commerce

DNN is committed to being an organization that is innovative, adaptive, and anticipatory as it responds to current and evolving global nuclear risks.

Mission Statement

Develop and implement policy and technical solutions to eliminate proliferation-sensitive material and limit or prevent the spread of material, technology, and expertise related to nuclear and radiological weapons and programs around the world.

Budget

Fiscal Year	Budget
FY 2019 enacted	$1,626,175,000
FY 2020 enacted	$1,778,605,000
FY 2021 requested	$1,660,139,000

Human Resources

FY 2020 authorized full-time equivalents (FTEs): 190

History

DOE performs a unique and indispensable role in reducing global nuclear and radiological dangers, contributing to U.S. national security and global security writ large. The predecessor organization to today’s DOE, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the AEC’s—and now DOE’s—role in nuclear nonproliferation dates back to its founding and the realization that without proper controls on nuclear technology and material, dozens of countries could acquire nuclear weapons, resulting in a dangerous and unstable world. In response, the United States led a global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. Many of those early efforts remain pillars of the global nonproliferation regime to this day including the Treaty on the Non- proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), export controls on sensitive technology, and international nuclear safeguards.

DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation work is mainly performed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which was established when NNSA was created in March 2000. Early on, DNN assumed responsibility for long-time DOE programs that fulfilled statutory responsibilities over the export control of nuclear technology, met U.S. obligations under the NPT by providing support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and provided technical support to the negotiation and implementation of strategic nuclear arms control treaties and other multilateral nuclear nonproliferation treaties and agreements. DNN also consolidated the work that DOE had started after the breakup of the Soviet Union aimed at addressing the proliferation risks involving nuclear weapons, weapon-usable nuclear materials, and their storage facilities in the newly independent Soviet states.

DNN’s nonproliferation mission expanded in response to the terrorist attacks carried out on September 11, 2001. New areas of focus included expanding efforts to install radiation detection monitors; accelerating existing efforts to convert research reactors and medical isotope production facilities from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); improving security for and disposition of radioactive materials that could be used in dispersal devices (i.e., “dirty bombs”); and increasing research into new technologies, techniques, and materials to help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to hostile state and non-state actors.

DNN programs have implemented high-profile nuclear threat reduction initiatives, including:

Securing 268 buildings with radioactive sources worldwide, installing Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM’s) at 60 sites, and deploying 67 Mobile Detection System (MDS) vans internationally since 2017
Delivering 47 space-based sensors to maintain U.S. capabilities to globally monitor for surface, atmospheric, and outer space nuclear explosions.
Converting or verifying the shutdown of 106 civilian research reactors and medical isotope production facilities using HEU; removing or confirming the disposition of more than 506 metric tons (MT) of HEU and plutonium (Pu) from 48 countries and Taiwan; and permanently eliminating more than 163.5 MT of HEU by downblending it into LEU.
Monitoring the conversion of 418.6 MT of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons into LEU used to generate nearly 10% of U.S. electricity under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement

Functions

Global Material Security

Works with partner countries to increase the security of nuclear and radioactive materials, and improve partner capabilities to detect, disrupt, and investigate illicit nuclear trafficking to prevent the use of these materials by terrorists.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development

Drives innovative research that develops technologies and expertise to detect foreign nuclear proliferation activities and produces technologies for integration into operational systems by leveraging capabilities at the national laboratories, plants, and sites, as well as at universities and within private industry.

Material Management and Minimization

Eliminates the need for, and use or production of, weapon-usable nuclear materials such as HEU and Pu through conversion of facilities, removal of materials no longer in use, and downblending or otherwise disposing of materials.

Nonproliferation and Arms Control

Strengthens the nonproliferation and arms control regimes to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions.

U.S. Nuclear Forensics and Counterproliferation Capabilities

Deter and disrupt nuclear proliferation and threats by advancing U.S. nuclear forensics and counterproliferation capabilities and expertise and identifying and responding to emerging threats to global nuclear security through the rapid development and application of technical solutions.

Recent Organization Accomplishments

Nuclear Material Removals

Completed several multi-year nuclear material removal campaigns, including: the removal of nearly 700 kilograms of HEU from the United Kingdom; the removal of 367 kilograms of HEU from Canada; and the removal from Ghana and Nigeria of their remaining stocks of HEU, as part of a cooperative effort with the IAEA, China, Russia, and the Czech Republic.

Domestic Production of Mo-99

Partnered with commercial industry in the United States to produce the critical medical radioisotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). This was the first domestic production of Mo-99 in nearly 30 years.

Material Disposition

In 2018, the Department terminated the Mixed Oxide (MOX) facility that had been the planned pathway for the disposition of 34 MT of surplus Pu. The Department now plans to dispose of this material via downblending of the surplus Pu and emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), while removing surplus plutonium from South Carolina. In support of this effort, a 2020 Amended Record of Decision provided the pathway to downblend and disposition 7.1 MT of surplus Pu.

Cesium Irradiator Replacement

Completed 151 Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) removals from U.S. hospitals and universities. By replacing these irradiators, DNN has eliminated the risk of their radioactive sources being used in an act of radiological terrorism. DNN is on pace to remove all cesium-based blood irradiators in the United States by 2027.

Early Detection

Achieved significant, measured progress in early detection of foreign weapons development activity and proliferation through a series of threat-based, operational testbeds, and advanced methods and modeling.

Warhead Measurement Campaign

Completed the Warhead Measurement Campaign that collected high fidelity, archival, radiation signature measurements of the W76, B61 and B83 in support of future arms control treaty negotiations.

Source Physics Experiment

Successfully completed the Source Physics Experiment to improve our Nation’s confidence in characterizing foreign underground nuclear tests.

Nuclear Detonation Detection Payloads

Delivered 10 nuclear detonation detection payloads to the USAF for integration into operational national systems to detect, locate, identify, and characterize nuclear explosions globally, 24/7.

Training and recruitment of Technical Experts

Established university pipeline to migrate top talent toward technical applications in national nuclear security, awarding over 440 degrees, including 169 PhDs, resulting in more than 115 new career placements in the DOE/NNSA’s national laboratories and 135 in the nuclear nonproliferation community.

IAEA safeguards agreements

Expanded efforts to promote the highest standard of IAEA safeguards agreements with all non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the NPT. Within one year of the organization’s initial bilateral engagements with Liberia and Benin on IAEA safeguards agreements, both countries entered into force these agreements

Civil nuclear licensing

Reduced processing times for applications to export unclassified U.S. civil nuclear technology by nearly 50 percent, while still maintaining strong nonproliferation controls on such transfers. The organization has also expanded outreach and assistance to U.S. exporters.

Leadership Challenges

Evolution of proliferation threat The proliferation threat continues to evolve, including through advances in nuclear and dual- use technologies, and this evolution threatens to outpace our response. We are working to develop preventative measures in order to stay ahead of such threats, including through potential application of export controls.

Balancing of nonproliferation and civil nuclear goals

NNSA will continue to be challenged to develop strategies and approaches that advance U.S. nuclear nonproliferation norms in a manner that facilitates civil nuclear exports.

Supply chain challenges

Changes in supply chain drive the need to identify and mitigate program, budget, and security risks, especially for the United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS).

Loss of technical expertise

Losing key expertise risks national capabilities for meeting future nonproliferation goals and success in high-priority nonproliferation and arms control applications.

Human Resources

Staffing remains an ongoing challenge for DNN. Additional federal staff, particularly mid-to-senior level officials, are required to provide the oversight for existing programs and to work with the National Laboratories to develop innovative approaches to new challenges.

Nuclear Forensics

Assuming U.S. Department of Homeland Security forensics roles and responsibilities.

Critical Events and Action Items

3-month events (December 2020-Feburary 2021) The New START Treaty will expire on 5 February 2021 if not extended.

NNSA will announce the selection of awards for Mo- 99 cooperative agreements in response to a funding opportunity announcement to establish domestic supplies of Mo-99 by December 2023.

The NNSA Administrator is expected to sign a Notice of Intent (NOI) to begin an environmental analysis which will provide National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) coverage to the 34 MT Pu disposition mission. This NEPA analysis will evaluate the dilute and dispose alternative, also known as Pu downblending, and any other identified, reasonable alternatives for surplus plutonium disposition.

The 2021 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon), originally scheduled for April 27-May 22, 2020, is tentatively scheduled to take place from January 4-29, 2021. A final decision on the new RevCon dates and format of the meeting is expected in October 2020.

As early as January 2021, DNN will announce the awardees for a new university consortium under the IUP. This five-year grant ($25M total funding) will continue DNN’s efforts to establish basic R&D capabilities at U.S. universities and enable a pipeline of students who have performed nuclear engineering and nuclear physics research into the national laboratory system.

6-month events (March 2021-May 2021)

Conversion of Kazakhstan’s IVG.1M Reactor to LEU fuel.

Issuance of the final Analysis of Alternatives report for a pit disassembly and processing capability. Pit disassembly and processing provides Pu oxide feed for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition program at Savannah River Site and supports the 34 MT Pu disposition mission. This is critical in order to resolve potential mission conflicts in PF-4 at LANL between NNSA’s Office of Defense Program’s pit production mission and the 34 MT surplus plutonium disposition mission.

12-month events (June 2021-December 2021)

Sign a Secretarial Determination to certify the sufficiency of supply of Mo-99 produced without HEU that will subsequently enact a ban on exporting HEU for medical isotope production.