Unitary executive theory: Difference between revisions

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Subsequent cases such as ''[[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]]'' (presidential removal of certain kinds of officers), and ''[[Bowsher v. Synar]]'' (control of executive functions) have flexed the doctrine's reach back and forth. [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] in his solitary dissent in ''[[Morrison v. Olson]]'' argued for an unlimited presidential removal power of all persons exercising executive branch powers, which he argued included the [[independent counsel]]; the court disagreed, but later moved closer to Scalia's position in ''[[Edmond v. United States]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |last2=Lawson |first2=Gary |name-list-style=amp |year=2007 |title=The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia |url=http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=107 |pages=1002–1047 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090306120412/http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |archive-date=6 March 2009}}</ref> Many of the proponents clerked for Justice Scalia.<ref name=":13" />
Subsequent cases such as ''[[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]]'' (presidential removal of certain kinds of officers), and ''[[Bowsher v. Synar]]'' (control of executive functions) have flexed the doctrine's reach back and forth. [[Antonin Scalia|Justice Scalia]] in his solitary dissent in ''[[Morrison v. Olson]]'' argued for an unlimited presidential removal power of all persons exercising executive branch powers, which he argued included the [[independent counsel]]; the court disagreed, but later moved closer to Scalia's position in ''[[Edmond v. United States]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Calabresi |first1=Steven |last2=Lawson |first2=Gary |name-list-style=amp |year=2007 |title=The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia |url=http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=[[Columbia Law Review]] |volume=107 |pages=1002–1047 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090306120412/http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/107/4/Calabresi-Lawson.pdf |archive-date=6 March 2009}}</ref> Many of the proponents clerked for Justice Scalia.<ref name=":13" />


In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed more support for the theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power |url=https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_court_cases_relevant_to_executive_appointment_and_removal_power|access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Ballotpedia |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref> In ''[[Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau]]'' and ''[[Collins v. Yellen]]'', the Court held that some attempts to curtail presidential removal power of agencies with a single director violate the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|separation of powers]]. Justice Samuel Alito went so far as to write, "The Constitution prohibits even 'modest restrictions' on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer." The Court reiterated that the only exceptions to the president's removal power were those precedents found in ''Humphrey's Executor'' and ''Morrison''.<ref name="reason decision">{{cite web | url = https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | title = With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence | first = Jonathan | last = Adler | date = June 29, 2020 | access-date = August 5, 2024 | work = [[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] | archive-date = June 29, 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200629232919/https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | url-status = live }}</ref> The four justices appointed by a Democratic president dissented in ''Seila'', arguing that the constitution makes no such claims.<ref name=":252">{{Cite journal |last=Sitaraman |first=Ganesh |author-link=Ganesh Sitaraman |date=2020 |title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power |url=https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-352.pdf |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=134 |pages=380 |quote=Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority’s thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB’s independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> ''Collins'' was a very similar case taken up the next year, and the precedent of ''Seila'' was applied to ''Collins'' in a 7−2 ruling.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 23, 2021 |title=U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/23/us-supreme-court-bolsters-presidential-power-over-housing-finance-agency.html |agency=[[Reuters]] |accessdate=June 23, 2021 |work=[[CNBC]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite court|litigants=Collins v. Yellen |vol=594|reporter=U.S.|opinion=220|pinpoint=|court=|year=2021|url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-06 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref>
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed more support for the theory.<ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date= |title=List of court cases relevant to executive appointment and removal power |url=https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_court_cases_relevant_to_executive_appointment_and_removal_power|access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Ballotpedia |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sitaraman|first=Ganesh|date=2020|title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power|journal=Harvard Law Review|volume=134|pages=380}}</ref> In ''[[Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau]]'' and ''[[Collins v. Yellen]]'', the Court held that some attempts to curtail presidential removal power of agencies with a single director violate the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|separation of powers]]. Justice Samuel Alito went so far as to write, "The Constitution prohibits even 'modest restrictions' on the President's power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer." The Court reiterated that the only exceptions to the president's removal power were those precedents found in ''Humphrey's Executor'' and ''Morrison''.<ref name="reason decision">{{cite web | url = https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | title = With Chief in Charge, SCOTUS Strikes Down Louisiana Abortion Law and Eliminates CFPB Independence | first = Jonathan | last = Adler | date = June 29, 2020 | access-date = August 5, 2024 | work = [[Reason (magazine)|Reason]] | archive-date = June 29, 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200629232919/https://reason.com/2020/06/29/with-chief-in-charge-scotus-strikes-down-louisiana-abortion-law-and-eliminates-cfpb-independence/ | url-status = live }}</ref> The four justices appointed by a Democratic president dissented in ''Seila'', arguing that the constitution makes no such claims.<ref name=":252">{{Cite journal |last=Sitaraman |first=Ganesh |author-link=Ganesh Sitaraman |date=2020 |title=The Political Economy of the Removal Power |url=https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/134-Harv.-L.-Rev.-352.pdf |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=134 |pages=380 |quote=Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with the three other liberal Justices. In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation of powers. She systematically argued that 'constitutional text, history, and precedent invalidate the majority’s thesis.' Justice Kagan even accused the majority of 'gerrymander[ing]' their 'made up' rule to strike down the CFPB’s independent structure. For a separation of powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-05 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> ''Collins'' was a very similar case taken up the next year, and the precedent of ''Seila'' was applied to ''Collins'' in a 7−2 ruling.<ref>{{cite web |date=June 23, 2021 |title=U.S. Supreme Court bolsters presidential power over housing finance agency |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/23/us-supreme-court-bolsters-presidential-power-over-housing-finance-agency.html |agency=Reuters |accessdate=June 23, 2021 |work=[[CNBC]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite court|litigants=Collins v. Yellen |vol=594|reporter=U.S.|opinion=220|pinpoint=|court=|year=2021|url=https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Millhiser |first=Ian |date=2020-06-29 |title=The Supreme Court's big decision on the CFPB and the "unitary executive," explained |url=https://www.vox.com/2020/6/29/21307083/supreme-court-cfpb-seila-law-chief-justice-john-roberts-unitary-executive |access-date=2024-08-06 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref>


=== Growth of presidential powers ===
=== Growth of presidential powers ===