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United States Army Air Forces: Difference between revisions
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The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of [[strategic bombing]] at the [[Air Corps Tactical School]] that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. [[Billy Mitchell]] that led to his later [[court-martial]]. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department [[Staff (military)|General Staff]] (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 112–113.</ref> | The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of [[strategic bombing]] at the [[Air Corps Tactical School]] that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. [[Billy Mitchell]] that led to his later [[court-martial]]. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department [[Staff (military)|General Staff]] (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 112–113.</ref> | ||
A major step toward a separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the ''"General Headquarters Air Force"''. Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the [[corps area]]s (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General [[John J. Pershing]] during World War I. In 1924, the General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] model of | A major step toward a separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the ''"General Headquarters Air Force"''. Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the [[corps area]]s (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General [[John J. Pershing]] during World War I. In 1924, the General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] model of World War I, with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a ''coup d'état'' but was not activated. | ||
The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 130.</ref> GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]], Pacific, and [[Gulf of Mexico|Gulf coasts]] but was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.<ref group=n>Three examples of the negative effects of this long-ingrained policy, even after creation of the AAF, occurred in Hawaii in the six months preceding the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], where neither the Air Corps nor the AFCC had any command jurisdiction. First, Maj. Gen. [[Walter C. Short]], commanding general of the [[United States Army|U.S. Army's]] [[Hawaiian Department]], held the opinion that the [[Seventh Air Force|Hawaiian Air Force]] was grossly overstaffed and mandated in July 1941 that its non-flying AAF personnel complete infantry training, a program that took them from their primary jobs for a period of six to eight weeks. Second, efforts in October and November to complete gunnery training for B-17 gunners were stifled when aircrew were used by the Hawaiian Department to guard warehouses in [[Honolulu]]. Finally, after the War Department issued a war warning to Pacific commands on 27 November, Short insisted despite objections from his air commanders that aircraft be parked close together on open ramps as a security measure against [[sabotage]] rather than being dispersed in revetments for protection against air attack. (Arakaki and Kuborn, pp. 5–6, 38)</ref> Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals [[Frank Maxwell Andrews|Frank M. Andrews]] and [[Oscar Westover]] respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 131–133.</ref> | The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 130.</ref> GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]], Pacific, and [[Gulf of Mexico|Gulf coasts]] but was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.<ref group=n>Three examples of the negative effects of this long-ingrained policy, even after creation of the AAF, occurred in Hawaii in the six months preceding the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], where neither the Air Corps nor the AFCC had any command jurisdiction. First, Maj. Gen. [[Walter C. Short]], commanding general of the [[United States Army|U.S. Army's]] [[Hawaiian Department]], held the opinion that the [[Seventh Air Force|Hawaiian Air Force]] was grossly overstaffed and mandated in July 1941 that its non-flying AAF personnel complete infantry training, a program that took them from their primary jobs for a period of six to eight weeks. Second, efforts in October and November to complete gunnery training for B-17 gunners were stifled when aircrew were used by the Hawaiian Department to guard warehouses in [[Honolulu]]. Finally, after the War Department issued a war warning to Pacific commands on 27 November, Short insisted despite objections from his air commanders that aircraft be parked close together on open ramps as a security measure against [[sabotage]] rather than being dispersed in revetments for protection against air attack. (Arakaki and Kuborn, pp. 5–6, 38)</ref> Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals [[Frank Maxwell Andrews|Frank M. Andrews]] and [[Oscar Westover]] respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 131–133.</ref> | ||