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Army Science Board: Difference between revisions
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Following World War II, despite General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warnings that using scientific and technological resources solely for procurement purposes limited the usefulness of those resources and indications that separating R&D from procurement and production would benefit the military, concerns remained that the senior Army leadership lacked the vision to effectively guide the direction of R&D programs. However, funding and personnel limitations continued to direct R&D toward the necessary areas of procurement and production. A few years later, Dr. Donald Loughridge, the Army's Senior Scientific Advisor, was concerned that the Army lacked an effective basic research program, resulting in its inability to attract desirable entry-level scientists to its laboratories. By April 1950, Secretary of the Army [[Gordon Gray (politician)|Gordon Gray]] was also concerned with the Army's R&D program and its ability to support warfighters in future wars. He did not believe that the United States could fight a war based solely upon soldiers, especially with the fall of China to communism. {{sfn|Haraburda|2006|p=71}} | Following World War II, despite General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warnings that using scientific and technological resources solely for procurement purposes limited the usefulness of those resources and indications that separating R&D from procurement and production would benefit the military, concerns remained that the senior Army leadership lacked the vision to effectively guide the direction of R&D programs. However, funding and personnel limitations continued to direct R&D toward the necessary areas of procurement and production. A few years later, Dr. Donald Loughridge, the Army's Senior Scientific Advisor, was concerned that the Army lacked an effective basic research program, resulting in its inability to attract desirable entry-level scientists to its laboratories. By April 1950, Secretary of the Army [[Gordon Gray (politician)|Gordon Gray]] was also concerned with the Army's R&D program and its ability to support warfighters in future wars. He did not believe that the United States could fight a war based solely upon soldiers, especially with the fall of China to communism. {{sfn|Haraburda|2006|p=71}} | ||
Shortly thereafter, Gray's replacement, Secretary of the Army [[Frank Pace]], evaluated the existing Army R&D program, which was then engaged in supporting the | Shortly thereafter, Gray's replacement, Secretary of the Army [[Frank Pace]], evaluated the existing Army R&D program, which was then engaged in supporting the Korean War. In January 1951, the evaluators recommended that a research advisory board be established to assist the Secretary of the Army in R&D matters. Based on this report, General [[J. Lawton Collins|Joseph Collins]], Army Chief of Staff, recommended establishing an Army Scientific Advisory Committee as this research advisory board. By March, Pace approved establishing this board in principle and in November he took the first steps to obtain this scientific advice. Without formally establishing a committee, the secretary appointed 10 outstanding scientists and industrialists as his scientific advisers. These pioneer advisers were: {{sfn|Haraburda|2006|pp=71-72}} | ||
* Dr. [[Detlev Bronk]], National Academy of Sciences President, 1950 to 1962, and Johns Hopkins University President, 1949 to 1953. He was credited with formulating the modern theory of biophysics. | * Dr. [[Detlev Bronk]], National Academy of Sciences President, 1950 to 1962, and Johns Hopkins University President, 1949 to 1953. He was credited with formulating the modern theory of biophysics. | ||