CargoAdmin, Bureaucrats, Moderators (CommentStreams), fileuploaders, Interface administrators, newuser, Push subscription managers, Suppressors, Administrators
13,588
edits
m (1 revision imported) |
m (Text replacement - "The New York Times" to "The New York Times") |
||
Line 43: | Line 43: | ||
=== Special report on China === | === Special report on China === | ||
In September 2023, the U.S. State Department published ''Global Engagement Center Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment''.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Chinese Information Manipulation: A Conversation with Daniel Kliman {{!}} ChinaPower {{!}} CSIS Podcasts |url=https://www.csis.org/podcasts/chinapower/chinese-information-manipulation-conversation-daniel-kliman |access-date=December 8, 2023 |website=www.csis.org |language=en}}</ref> In what the ''[[Associated Press]]'' called "a first-of-its-kind-report",<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=October 4, 2023 |title=The US warns of a Chinese global disinformation campaign that could undermine peace and stability |url=https://apnews.com/article/disinformation-china-us-xinjiang-global-opinion-c9e033f22622841935a2b1bc1060c01b |access-date=October 28, 2023 |website=AP News |language=en |archive-date=October 28, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028172901/https://apnews.com/article/disinformation-china-us-xinjiang-global-opinion-c9e033f22622841935a2b1bc1060c01b |url-status=live }}</ref> the State Department accused the Chinese government of using "deceptive and coercive methods" to influence public opinion.<ref name=":6" /> The methods discussed included buying content and acquiring stakes in newspapers and television networks outside China; coercing international organizations and media outlets to silence its critics; creating fake personas to spread disinformation; and using repression to shut down social media accounts.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":5" /> '' | In September 2023, the U.S. State Department published ''Global Engagement Center Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment''.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Chinese Information Manipulation: A Conversation with Daniel Kliman {{!}} ChinaPower {{!}} CSIS Podcasts |url=https://www.csis.org/podcasts/chinapower/chinese-information-manipulation-conversation-daniel-kliman |access-date=December 8, 2023 |website=www.csis.org |language=en}}</ref> In what the ''[[Associated Press]]'' called "a first-of-its-kind-report",<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=October 4, 2023 |title=The US warns of a Chinese global disinformation campaign that could undermine peace and stability |url=https://apnews.com/article/disinformation-china-us-xinjiang-global-opinion-c9e033f22622841935a2b1bc1060c01b |access-date=October 28, 2023 |website=AP News |language=en |archive-date=October 28, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028172901/https://apnews.com/article/disinformation-china-us-xinjiang-global-opinion-c9e033f22622841935a2b1bc1060c01b |url-status=live }}</ref> the State Department accused the Chinese government of using "deceptive and coercive methods" to influence public opinion.<ref name=":6" /> The methods discussed included buying content and acquiring stakes in newspapers and television networks outside China; coercing international organizations and media outlets to silence its critics; creating fake personas to spread disinformation; and using repression to shut down social media accounts.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":5" /> ''The New York Times'' wrote that the accusations "reflect worry in Washington that China’s information operations pose a growing security challenge to the United States and to democratic principles around the world by promoting 'digital authoritarianism.'"<ref name=":6">{{Cite news |last=Myers |first=Steven Lee |date=September 28, 2023 |title=China Uses 'Deceptive' Methods to Sow Disinformation, U.S. Says |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/28/technology/china-disinformation-us-state-department.html |access-date=October 23, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230928200130/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/28/technology/china-disinformation-us-state-department.html |archive-date=September 28, 2023}}</ref> | ||
=== Pre-empting disinformation === | === Pre-empting disinformation === | ||
In October 2023, GEC took the unusual step of exposing a nascent disinformation campaign as it had barely gotten off the ground, publicly linking a Pressenza article recycling disinformation about a Russian Orthodox monastery in [[Kyiv]], [[Ukraine]], to a covert operation to spread Russian propaganda in Central and [[South America]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Meyers |first=Steven Lee |date=October 26, 2023 |title=U.S. Tries New Tack on Russian Disinformation: Pre-Empting It |work= | In October 2023, GEC took the unusual step of exposing a nascent disinformation campaign as it had barely gotten off the ground, publicly linking a Pressenza article recycling disinformation about a Russian Orthodox monastery in [[Kyiv]], [[Ukraine]], to a covert operation to spread Russian propaganda in Central and [[South America]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Meyers |first=Steven Lee |date=October 26, 2023 |title=U.S. Tries New Tack on Russian Disinformation: Pre-Empting It |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/26/technology/russian-disinformation-us-state-department-campaign.html |url-access=subscription |access-date=November 17, 2023 |archive-date=December 1, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231201231306/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/26/technology/russian-disinformation-us-state-department-campaign.html |url-status=live }}</ref> | ||
== Reception == | == Reception == |
edits