United States Army Air Forces: Difference between revisions

The AAF administered all parts of military aviation formerly distributed among the Air Corps, General Headquarters Air Force, and the ground forces' corps area commanders and thus became the first air organization of the U.S. Army to control its own installations and support personnel. The peak size of the AAF during World War II was over 2.4&nbsp;million men and women in service and nearly 80,000 aircraft by 1944, and 783 domestic bases in December 1943.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 176 and 378. Also, see growth tables above.</ref> By "[[Victory in Europe Day|V-E Day]]", the Army Air Forces had 1.25&nbsp;million men stationed overseas and operated from more than 1,600 airfields worldwide.<ref>''AAF Statistical Digest'', Table 215 – Airfields in CONUS 1941–1945; Table 217 – Airfields outside CONUS 1941–1945.</ref>

Although other nations already had separate air forces independent of their army or navy (such as the Royal Air Force and the German ''[[Luftwaffe]]''), the AAF remained a part of the Army until a defense reorganization in the post-war period resulted in the passage by the [[United States Congress]] of the [[National Security Act of 1947]] with the creation of an independent [[United States Air Force]] in September 1947.

The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of [[strategic bombing]] at the [[Air Corps Tactical School]] that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. [[Billy Mitchell]] that led to his later [[court-martial]]. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department [[Staff (military)|General Staff]] (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 112–113.</ref>

The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 130.</ref> GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]], Pacific, and [[Gulf of Mexico|Gulf coasts]] but was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.<ref group=n>Three examples of the negative effects of this long-ingrained policy, even after creation of the AAF, occurred in Hawaii in the six months preceding the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], where neither the Air Corps nor the AFCC had any command jurisdiction. First, Maj. Gen. [[Walter C. Short]], commanding general of the [[United States Army|U.S. Army's]] [[Hawaiian Department]], held the opinion that the [[Seventh Air Force|Hawaiian Air Force]] was grossly overstaffed and mandated in July 1941 that its non-flying AAF personnel complete infantry training, a program that took them from their primary jobs for a period of six to eight weeks. Second, efforts in October and November to complete gunnery training for B-17 gunners were stifled when aircrew were used by the Hawaiian Department to guard warehouses in [[Honolulu]]. Finally, after the War Department issued a war warning to Pacific commands on 27 November, Short insisted despite objections from his air commanders that aircraft be parked close together on open ramps as a security measure against [[sabotage]] rather than being dispersed in revetments for protection against air attack. (Arakaki and Kuborn, pp. 5–6, 38)</ref> Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals [[Frank Maxwell Andrews|Frank M. Andrews]] and [[Oscar Westover]] respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 131–133.</ref>

Total [[sortie]]s flown by the AAF during World War II were 2,352,800, with 1,693,565 flown in Europe-related areas and 669,235 flown in the Pacific and Far East.<ref>Correll, "The US Army Air Forces at War", p. 32.</ref>

===Demobilization and independence===

Arnold left the AAF with two important legacies, based on his experiences in World War II, which shaped the post-war USAAF and their independent successor. The first was a requirement that the command staff of the service must include [[Staff (military)|staff officers]] of varying expertise besides pilots. The second was the belief that despite the unqualified success of training methods that had expanded the Air Forces, the United States would never again have the time to mobilize and train the [[Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces|reserve components]] as they had in 1940, necessitating that reservists and National Guardsmen be immediately ready for service in case of national emergency.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 374.</ref>

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On 11 April 1945, at the conclusion of a ten-month study that took them to every major theater to interview 80 "key military and naval personnel", the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense recommended that the armed forces of United States be organized into a single cabinet department, and that "three coordinate combat branches, Army, Navy, and Air" comprise the operational services. The committee reported that the statutory creation of a United States Air Force would merely recognize a situation that had evolved during World War II with the Army Air Forces, acknowledging that naval/marine aviation and some aspects of army aviation would remain in place. The committee also reported that its recommendation was approved by "Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fleet Admirals Chester W. Nimitz and William F. Halsey and numerous other leading military and naval personnel".<ref name="mac104107"/>

Congress, at the recommendation of Truman, created the [[United States Department of the Air Force|Department of the Air Force]] with enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 ''Stat''. 495), 26 July 1947. The act established the [[United States Air Force]], a completely separate branch of the U.S. military, and abolished both the Army Air Forces and the Air Corps, effective 18 September 1947.<ref>[http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104613/the-us-air-force.aspx "The Air Force Fact Sheet"] (AF.mil) Retrieved 25 April 2016.</ref> The transfer of personnel and assets from the AAF to the USAF was effected by Transfer Order 1, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 26 September 1947.<ref name="natarc" />

===Uniforms===

====Service dress====

USAAF uniforms for all members consisted of a winter service uniform of [[Olive (color)|olive drab]] wool worn in temperate weather and a tropical weather summer service uniform of [[khaki]] cotton the same as those of other U.S. Army forces. In addition to the service uniforms usually worn for dress purposes and on pass from posts there were a variety of fatigue and flying uniforms. Summer and winter service uniforms were both worn throughout the year in the continental U.S. During World War II the European theater of operations was considered a year-round temperate uniform zone and the Pacific theater of operations a year-round tropical uniform zone.<ref>Table of Equipment No. 21 1 September 1945 Part II (theater clothing zones).</ref>

The issue enlisted men's winter service uniform consisted of a four pocket coat and trousers in olive drab shade 33 (light shade) 16&nbsp;oz wool [[Serge (fabric)|serge]]. Shirts with two patch pockets and without shoulder straps were either 8.2&nbsp;oz [[Chino cloth|chino cotton]] khaki, a light tan, shade No. 1, or 10.5&nbsp;oz olive drab wool light shade No. 33. Either shirt could be worn under the coat; however, the cotton shirt could not be worn as an outer garment with the wool trousers.<ref name="ReferenceA">AR 600-35 31 March 1944 (Section I, para. 2; Section II, para. 18).</ref> The wool necktie for the winter uniform was black and the summer necktie was khaki cotton, originally.<ref>AR 600-35 10 November 1941</ref> In February 1942 a universal mohair wool necktie in olive drab shade 3 and cotton blend khaki shade 5 were authorized for both uniforms.<ref>Risch and Pitkin, p. 47.</ref><ref name="AR 600-35 Section I, para. 2a3">AR 600-35 (Section I, para. 2a3).</ref> An overcoat of OD shade 33 [[Melton Mowbray#Melton cloth|Melton wool]] was worn in cold weather. The enlisted man's summer service uniform consisted of the same cotton khaki shade No. 1 uniform shirt with matching trousers; the coat for this uniform stopped being issued in the 1930s. Whenever the shirt was worn as an outer garment the necktie was tucked between the second and third button of the shirt.<ref>AR 600-40 (Section 3, para. 39).</ref>

The male officer's winter service uniform consisted of a coat of finer wool fabric in olive drab shade No. 51 (dark-shade) with a fabric belt matching the coat, nicknamed "greens". Officers could wear trousers matching the color and fabric of the coat, or optionally they were allowed taupe colored, officially called "drab shade 54", trousers of the same material as the coat, nicknamed "pinks", leading to the nickname "pinks and greens" for the iconic combination.<ref>AR 600-35 31 March 1944 (Section I, para. 2; Section II, para. 9, 19).</ref> Officers were also authorized to use the more durable olive drab shade 33 serge uniforms, except for the enlisted men's four pocket service coat, as long as they were not mixed with OD Shade 51 or Drab Shade 54 clothing.<ref>Army Officers Guide 1942, p. 132.</ref> An officer's OD overcoat and taupe rain coat were also authorized. Officers wore same cotton khaki shade No. 1 or olive drab wool light shade No. 33 shirts as enlisted men except with the addition of shoulder straps. Officers also had additional shirt color and fabric options, OD dark shade No. 50 or No. 51 and in 1944 drab shade No. 54.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>