View source for Coalition Provisional Authority

{{Short description|2003–2004 transitional government of Iraq}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2022}}
{{Infobox country
| native_name            = {{small|(2003&ndash;2004)}}<br />{{lang|ar|جمهورية العراق}}<br />{{small|''{{transliteration|ar|Jumhūriyyat al-ʽIrāq}}''}}<!--<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4df40.html|title=Iraq: Resolution No. 460 of 1991 (official toponymy)|publisher=[[United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]]|date=6 January 1992|access-date=25 October 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://dds.crl.edu/item/252545|title=al-Waqāʼiʻ al-ʻIrāqīyah|publisher=CLR|date=6 January 1992|access-date=25 October 2020}} {{in lang|ar}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.archontology.org/nations/iraq/01_polity.php|title=Iraq: Polity Style: 1920-2020|website=Archontology.org|date=1 August 2017|access-date=25 October 2020}}</ref>-->
| conventional_long_name = Republic of Iraq
| common_name            = Iraq
| status                 = [[Transitional government]] under [[United States]] [[military occupation]]
| p1                     = Ba'athist Iraq{{!}}Ba'athist Iraq
| flag_p1                = Flag of Iraq, 1991-2004.svg
| s1                     = Iraq
| flag_s1                = Flag of Iraq (2004–2008).svg
| image_flag             = Flag of Iraq (2004–2008).svg
| image_flag2            = File:Flag_of_the_United_States.svg
| flag                   = [[Flag of Iraq|Top: Flag of Iraq]]<br />[[Flag of the United States|Bottom: Flag of the United States]]
| flag_type              = [[Flag of Iraq|Top: Flag of Iraq (2004)]]<br />[[Flag of the United States|Bottom: Flag of the United States]]
| image_coat             = Seal of the Coalition Provisional Authority Iraq.svg
| symbol                 = Coat of arms of Iraq
| symbol_type            = Seal of the Coalition Provisional Authority
| image_map              = Iraq (orthographic projection).svg
| image_map_caption      = The CPA exercised its influence over [[Iraq]].
| national_motto         = "Security, Liberty, Equality, Justice"
| national_anthem        = ''[[Mawtini (L. Zanbaka song)|Mawtini]]'' (''[[de facto]]'')<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/one-last-chance-002300729--oly.html|title=One last chance|publisher=Yahoo!|work=Yahoo! Sports|first=Dan|last=Wetzel|date=24 August 2004|access-date=4 December 2017|quote=The song is 'My Country.' It is relatively short, contains no words and was composed by a man named Lewis Zanbaka...|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171204172033/https://www.yahoo.com/news/one-last-chance-002300729--oly.html|archive-date=4 December 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Anthem>{{cite web|first1=Edward|last1=Schaffer|first2=Jan|last2=Scotland|first3=Reinhard|last3=Popp|url=http://www.nationalanthems.info/iq-65.htm|title=Iraq (1958-1965, 2003-2004)|date=2017|access-date=30 November 2017|work=National Anthems|quote=Immediately after the fall of the Sadam Hussein government in 2003, 'My Country' was used again for a brief time as an interim anthem until a new one was adopted. (The title of this anthem is identical to the title of the anthem that replaced it in 2004).|url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171201042916/http://www.nationalanthems.info/iq-65.htm|archive-date=1 December 2017}}</ref><br />({{langx|en|"My Homeland"}})<ref name=Anthem/><br />{{center|[[File:Former Iraqi national anthem (1958–1965, 2003–2004).wav]]}}<br />"[[The Star-Spangled Banner]]" (''[[de jure]]'')<br />{{center|[[File:Star Spangled Banner instrumental.ogg]]}}
| capital                = [[Baghdad]]
| largest_city           = capital
| common_languages       = [[Arabic]]<br />[[Kurdish languages|Kurdish]]<br />[[English language|English]] (''de facto'')
| government_type        = [[Transitional government]]
| legislature            = [[Iraqi Governing Council]]
| leader_title1          = [[President of the United States]]
| leader_title2          = American Administrator
| leader_title3          = [[Iraqi Governing Council|President of the Governing Council of Iraq]]
| leader_name1           = George W. Bush (2003-2004)<br><br>
| leader_name2           = [[Jay Garner]] (2003)<br>[[Paul Bremer]] (2003-2004)<br><br>
| leader_name3           = [[Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum]] (2003, 2004)<br>[[Ibrahim al-Jaafari]] (2003)<br>[[Ahmed Chalabi]] (2003)<br>[[Iyad Allawi]] (2003)<br>[[Jalal Talabani]] (2003)<br>[[Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim]] (2003)<br>[[Adnan Pachachi]] (2004)<br>[[Mohsen Abdel Hamid]] (2004)<br>[[Massoud Barzani]] (2004)<br>[[Ezzedine Salim]] (2004)<br>[[Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer]] (2004)
| year_leader1           = 2003&ndash;2004
| year_deputy1           = 2003
| year_deputy2           = 2003&ndash;2004
| era                    = Iraq War
| event_pre              = [[Saddam Hussein]] and [[Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region|Ba'ath Party]] deposed
| date_pre               = 21 April 2003
| event_start            = CPA established<ref>{{cite web |url=http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/REG1.pdf |title=Archived copy |website=iraqcoalition.org |access-date=11 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040223192229/http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/REG1.pdf |archive-date=23 February 2004 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
| date_start             = 16 May
| event1                 = [[Investment in post-invasion Iraq]]
| date_event1            = 23 October 2003
| year_start             = 2003
| event_end              = [[Iraqi Interim Government|Interim government]]
| date_end               = 28 June
| year_end               = 2004
| stat_year1             = 
| stat_area1             = 
| stat_pop1              = 
| currency               = [[Iraqi dinar]]<br>[[United States dollar]] ([[USD]])
| today                  = [[Iraq]]
}}
{{Infobox organization
| name                     = Coalition Provisional Authority<br />''{{transliteration|ar|Sultat Alaitilaf Almuaqata}}''<br />{{lang|ar|تحالف السلطة المؤقتة}}
| image                    = Seal of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq.svg
| image_border             = 
| size                     = <!-- default 200px -->
| alt                      = <!-- alt text; see [[WP:ALT]] -->
| caption                  = Seal of the CPA
| map                      = <!-- optional -->
| msize                    = <!-- map size, optional, default 250px -->
| malt                     = <!-- map alt text -->
| mcaption                 = <!-- optional -->
| map2                     = 
| abbreviation             = CPA
| motto                    = 
| predecessor              = [[Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq)|Revolutionary Command Council]] of [[Ba'athist Iraq]]
| successor                = [[Iraqi Interim Government]] of [[Iraq]]
| formation                = 16 May 2003
| type                     = [[Provisional government|Provisional authority]]
| purpose                  = [[Deliberative assembly]]<br />[[deliberative democracy]]
| headquarters             = [[Baghdad]]
| location                 = [[Iraq]]
| region_served            = 
| membership               = 
| language                 = [[Arabic]]<br />[[English language|English]]
| general                  = <!-- Secretary General -->
| leader_title             = American Administrator
| leader_name              = [[Jay Garner]] (2003)<br />[[Paul Bremer]] (2003-2004)
| leader_title2            = American Deputy Administrator
| leader_name2             = [[Richard Jones (U.S. diplomat)|Richard Jones]]
| leader_title3            = [[Iraqi Governing Council|President of the Governing Council of Iraq]]
| leader_name3             = [[Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum]] (2003, 2004)<br>[[Ibrahim al-Jaafari]] (2003)<br>[[Ahmed Chalabi]] (2003)<br>[[Iyad Allawi]] (2003)<br>[[Jalal Talabani]] (2003)<br>[[Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim]] (2003)<br>[[Adnan Pachachi]] (2004)<br>[[Mohsen Abdel Hamid]] (2004)<br>[[Massoud Barzani]] (2004)<br>[[Ezzedine Salim]] (2004)<br>[[Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer]] (2004)
| key_people               = 
| affiliations             = <!-- if any -->
| budget                   = 
| num_staff                = 
| num_volunteers           = 
| website                  = 
| remarks                  = 
| former name              = 
}}

The '''Coalition Provisional Authority''' ({{langx|ar|سلطة الائتلاف المؤقتة|translit=Sultat Alaitilaf Almuaqata}}; {{langx|ku|دەسەڵاتی کاتی هاوپەیمانی|translit=Desteya Demkî ya Hevbendiyê}}, {{Small|abbr.}} '''CPA''') was a [[Provisional government|transitional government]] of Iraq established following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|invasion of the country]] on 19 March 2003 by [[Multi-National Force – Iraq|U.S.-led Coalition forces]]. The invasion marked the fall of [[Ba'athist Iraq|Ba'athist regime]] led by [[Saddam Hussein]].

Citing [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483]] (2003) and the [[Law of war|laws of war]], the CPA was established in May 2003 and vested itself with [[executive (government)|executive]], [[Legislature|legislative]], and [[judiciary]] authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on 21 April 2003 until its dissolution on 28 June 2004.

The CPA was admonished for its mismanagement of funds allocated to the [[Investment in post-invasion Iraq|reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq]], with over $8 billion of these unaccounted for,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/07/iraq.features11|title = So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go?|website = [[TheGuardian.com]]|date = 6 July 2005}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a77/esq1206bowen-206-1/|title=Stuart Bowen|date=30 November 2006}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Ackerman |first=Spencer |date=6 March 2013 |title=Over $8B of the Money You Spent Rebuilding Iraq Was Wasted Outright |url=https://www.wired.com/2013/03/iraq-waste/ |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230517093017/https://www.wired.com/2013/03/iraq-waste/ |archive-date=17 May 2023 |access-date=2024-05-23 |magazine=Wired |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}}</ref> including over $1.6 billion in cash that emerged in a basement in [[Lebanon]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Carroll |first=Rory |date=12 October 2014 |title=Billions set aside for post-Saddam Iraq turned up in Lebanese bunker |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/iraq-bilions-iraq-lebanese-bunker |access-date=27 October 2021 |website=the Guardian |language=en}}</ref>

== History of the CPA ==
{{more citations needed section|date=June 2012}}

The '''Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance''' ({{Langx|ar|مكتب إعادة الإعمار والمساعدة الإنسانية|translit=Maktab 'ieadat al'iiemar walmusaeadat al'iinsania}}; {{Langx|ku|فەرمانگەی ئاوەدانکردنەوە و هاوکاری مرۆیی|translit=Ofîsa Nûavakirin û Alîkariya Mirovî}}, {{Small|abbr.}} '''ORHA''') was established on 20 January 2003 by the [[United States]] government two months before the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]].<ref>[[Thomas E. Ricks (journalist)]] (2006) ''[[Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq]]'': 81</ref> It was intended to act as a [[caretaker government|caretaker]] administration in Iraq until the creation of a [[democracy|democratically]] [[election|elected]] [[civilian control of the military|civilian government]].

Retired [[United States Army]] [[Lieutenant general|Lieutenant General]] [[Jay Garner]] was appointed as the Director of ORHA, along with three deputies, including British [[Major general (United Kingdom)|Major-General]] [[Tim Cross]], in 2003. Upon the dissolution of ORHA and the creation of the CPA, he then became the first chief executive of the CPA. Due to his past military experiences in Iraq during [[Gulf War|Operation Desert Storm]] in 1991 and his reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq during [[Operation Provide Comfort]], Garner's credentials and close ties to the U.S. [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] Donald Rumsfeld made him an obvious choice for the task. His term, however, lasted only from 21 April 2003 until he was replaced abruptly less than a month later by [[Paul Bremer]] on 11 May 2003.

Garner's swift dismissal from his post by U.S. authorities came as a surprise to many within the CPA. In an interview with the [[BBC]] program ''[[Newsnight]]'' Garner publicly stated that his preference was to put the Iraqi people in charge as soon as possible and to do it with some form of elections.

Upon assuming the post of chief executive of the CPA in May 2003, [[Paul Bremer]] also assumed the title of U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq. He was frequently called [[Ambassador]] by numerous media organizations and the [[White House]] because it was the highest government rank he had achieved (Ambassador to Netherlands). But Bremer was not ambassador to Iraq, and there was no U.S. [[diplomatic mission]] in Iraq until June 2004, after the CPA transferred [[sovereignty]] to the [[Iraqi Interim Government]].<ref>[https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefsofmission/iraq Chiefs of Mission: Iraq], US State Department</ref> At the CPA, Bremer moved quickly to install opaque and corruption-prone methods for the withdrawal and transportation of extremely large amounts of cash often transported from the US to Iraq by C-17 transport plane.<ref>{{Cite web|title=War and Occupation in Iraq - Chapter 9 English|url=https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/report/9corruption.htm|access-date=27 October 2021|website=archive.globalpolicy.org}}</ref>

[[File:bremer iraqi council.jpg|300px|thumb|Paul Bremer (second from left) and four members of the [[Iraqi Governing Council]]; [[Mowaffak al-Rubaie]], [[Ahmed Chalabi]], [[Adnan Pachachi]], and [[Adil Abdul-Mahdi]]. (Left to Right)]]
[[File:republican palace baghdad iraq.jpg|300px|thumb|right|Iraq's Republican Palace in Baghdad under CPA occupation in August 2003.]]
The CPA was created and funded as a division of the [[United States Department of Defense]], and as Administrator, Bremer reported directly to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]]. Although troops from several of the coalition countries were present in Iraq at this time, the [[United States Central Command]] (USCENTCOM) was the primary military apparatus charged with providing direct combat support to the CPA to enforce its authority during the occupation of Iraq.

While many of Saddam Hussein's ornate [[Republican Palace, Baghdad|palaces]] were looted in the days immediately following the invasion, most of the physical structures themselves survived relatively intact. It is in these numerous palaces situated throughout the country that the CPA chose to set up office in order to govern. Several of these palaces were retained by the U.S. government even after the transition of power back to the Iraqi people. The administration was centered in a district of [[Baghdad]] known as the [[Green Zone]], which eventually became a highly secure walled-off enclave.

The CPA was also responsible for administering the [[Development Fund for Iraq]] during the year following the invasion. This fund superseded the earlier UN [[Oil-for-Food Programme|Oil-for-food programme]], and provided funding for Iraq's wheat purchase program, the [[currency]] exchange program, the electricity and oil infrastructure programs, equipment for Iraq's security forces, Iraqi [[civil service]] salaries, and the operations of the various government ministries.

The first act of the CPA under Bremer, [[Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1]], was to order the [[de-Ba'athification]] of Iraqi society. On 23 May, [[Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2]] formally disbanded the Iraqi army,<ref>[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf CPA Order number 2 Dissolution of Entities] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040701202042/http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf |date=1 July 2004 }} Iraq Coalition.org. Accessed 8 February 2014.</ref> as well as other public servants including nurses and doctors and eventually led to the direct unemployment of more than 500,000 Iraqi citizens.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Naomi Klein {{!}} Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in pursuit of a neo-con utopia|url=https://naomiklein.org/baghdad-year-zero-pillaging-iraq-pursuit-neo-con-utopia/|access-date=27 October 2021|language=en-US}}</ref> On 22 July 2003, the CPA formed the [[Iraqi Governing Council]] and appointed its members. The Council membership consisted largely of Iraqi [[Expatriate|expatriates]] who had previously fled the country during the rule of Saddam Hussein and also with many outspoken [[Dissident|dissidents]] who had been persecuted by the former [[Ba'athist Iraq|Ba'athist regime]]. The CPA under Bremer then went on to privatise and sell off publicly owned assets and companies to multinational companies, whilst setting about issuing unilaterally developed decrees such as Order 37 and Order 39, which reduced Iraq's corporation tax from 40% to 15%<ref name="CPA Iraq">{{Cite web|title=CPA Iraq|url=https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/|access-date=27 October 2021|website=govinfo.library.unt.edu}}</ref> and allowed foreign entities to enjoy 100% ownership of Iraqi assets.<ref name="CPA Iraq"/>

Though still subordinate to the CPA, the Iraqi Governing Council had several key responsibilities of its own: appointing representatives to the [[United Nations]], appointing interim [[Minister (government)|ministers]] to Iraq's vacant cabinet positions, and drafting a temporary [[constitution]] known as the [[Transitional Administrative Law (Iraq)|Transitional Administrative Law]] (TAL), which would be used to govern Iraq until a permanent constitution could be written and approved by the general [[electoral district|electorate]].

In the late afternoon of 14 December 2003, the CPA held a [[press conference]] at the Iraqi Forum convention center within Baghdad's [[Green Zone]] to announce that former [[President of Iraq]] [[Saddam Hussein]] had been taken into custody the previous night from a [[defensive fighting position|foxhole]] in a town near Saddam's home town of [[Tikrit]], Iraq. Present at the announcement was Lieutenant General [[Ricardo Sanchez]] of the U.S. Army, Administrator Bremer, members of the [[United Kingdom|British]] and American [[Intelligence agency|intelligence agencies]], several members of the Iraqi Governing Council, and a large room full of [[journalist]]s representing news organizations from around the world.

In order to defeat possible insurgent planning and under pressure from the Bush White House which wanted the occupation to end by the 2004 presidential election, the CPA transferred power to the newly appointed [[Iraqi Interim Government]] at 10:26 AM local time on 28 June 2004. The transfer of power was originally scheduled for 30 June 2004, but because of a concern that the transfer would lead to insurgent attacks the ceremony was held, unannounced, two days ahead of schedule. The transfer took place behind closed doors with little fanfare. With the CPA disbanded, Bremer left Iraq that same day.

The United States hoped that Iraq could be reconstructed and [[democratization|democratized]] in much the same way as [[Japan]] and [[Germany]] were after the [[World War II|Second World War]], using them as "examples or even models of successful military occupations."<ref name="historyandpolicy">{{cite web|url=http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-10.html|title=Don't expect democracy this time: Japan and Iraq|last=Dower|first=John|date=April 2003|publisher=History & Policy|access-date=9 December 2010|location=United Kingdom|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100414124149/http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-10.html|archive-date=14 April 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref>

==Structure of the CPA==
The CPA was divided into four geographic regions. CPA North was headquartered in the northern Iraqi city of [[Erbil]], CPA Central in Baghdad at Saddam's former [[Republican Palace (Iraq)|Republican Palace]], CPA South Central in the Iraqi city of [[Hillah]] near the ruins of [[Babylon]] and CPA South in the southern Iraqi city of [[Basra]]. Each region operated semi-autonomously, and all four had the same common goals for reconstruction of the country. Throughout the existence of the CPA, the security situation and levels of [[civil unrest]] throughout the country varied by region, and these variances were reflected in the different levels of program
successes within the CPA divisions.

===Non-government organizations and private charities and the CPA===

====Role of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB)====
[[United Nations resolution]] [http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm 1483] transferred the authority to authorize expenditures from Iraq's oil revenue from the United Nations to the Coalition Provisional Authority—under certain conditions, including:
* The expenditures were made in an open, transparent manner.
* The expenditures were subject to the supervision of a blue ribbon panel of international financial experts, the IAMB.
* Spending decisions were to be made with meaningful Iraqi input.

The International Advisory and Monitoring Board consisted of senior financial experts from the United Nations, the [[International Monetary Fund]], the [[World Bank]] and the [[Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development]].

The IAMB had serious concerns over the CPA's lack of transparency and lack of adequate financial controls, which were never resolved. The IAMB still exists and is playing a role in the investigations into the CPA's financial management.

===The CPA's Program Review Board===
The [[Coalition Provisional Authority Program Review Board|Program Review Board]] (PRB) was an eleven-member board that consisted of ten staff members from the CPA and one member of the Iraqi Governing Council. The chair of the board was also the CPA's senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance.

It was the board's responsibility to review and make recommendations to the CPA administrator on which contracts should be awarded. In order to ensure transparency, all key discussions regarding the pros and cons of the programs under consideration were to be made public. The CPA administrator was supposed to make decisions on the awarding of contracts only after receiving a recommendation from this committee.

The Notes on Internal Control from [[KPMG]]'s audit of DFI expenditures was particularly critical of PRB record-keeping's failing to fulfill the CPA's transparency obligation. In particular:
* Meetings were held in which attendance was not recorded.
* Meetings were held in which decisions were made in the absence of quorums.
* The Program Review Board never recorded the motions to approve expenditures, who seconded motions, or which members were for or against those motions.
* In the 43 meetings held in 2003, the single Iraqi member of the board attended only two meetings.
* The minutes failed to contain sufficient detail for readers to understand why programs were approved.
* Program decisions that had been tabled were later approved informally outside the meetings, with no recording of the reasoning behind the decision.
* The board chair refused to certify the accuracy of the Board's bookkeeping.

== Privatization of Iraq's economy ==
{{main|Economic reform of Iraq}}

Prior to US occupation, Iraq had a [[centrally planned economy]].{{Dubious |reason=SOEs and protectionism do not a command economy make.|date=May 2020}} Among other things, it prohibited foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses, ran most large industries as state-owned enterprises, and imposed large [[tariff]]s to keep out foreign goods.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/96bf686fe9704cd7c1256dba0036a96e|title=Iraq's economy: Past, present, future|access-date=4 July 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061020155415/http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/96bf686fe9704cd7c1256dba0036a96e|archive-date=20 October 2006|url-status=live}}</ref> After the invasion of Iraq, the CPA quickly began issuing many binding orders privatizing Iraq's economy and opening it up to [[foreign direct investment|foreign investment]].

[[100 Orders|CPA Order 39]], entitled "Foreign Investment," provided that "A foreign investor shall be entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor," and that "[t]he amount of foreign participation in newly formed or existing business entities in Iraq shall not be limited...." Additionally, the foreign investor "shall be authorized to... transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including shares or profits and dividends....". Critics assert that the CPA drastically altered Iraq's economy, allowing virtually unlimited and unrestricted foreign investment and placing no limitations on the expatriation of profit. However, these policies were in accord with current international standards on [[foreign direct investment]] to which most of the developed world adheres.<ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/35/2956455.pdf#search='restrictions%20on%20foreign%20ownership%20WTO' oecd.org/~restrictions on foreign ownership WTO] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051017142401/http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/35/2956455.pdf#search='restrictions%20on%20foreign%20ownership%20WTO' |date=17 October 2005 }}. None.</ref><ref>[http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf Microsoft Word - wp20043.doc] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151017075449/http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf |date=17 October 2015 }}. (PDF) .</ref> The order concluded, "Where an [[treaty|international agreement]] to which Iraq is a party provides for more favorable terms with respect to foreign investors undertaking investment activities in Iraq, the more favorable terms under the international agreement shall apply."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20040701202817/http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220_CPAORD_39_Foreign_Investment_.pdf iraqcoalition.org/regulations/~Foreign_Investment_.pdf]. (PDF) .</ref> According to critics, this order was designed to create as favorable an environment for foreign investors as possible, thereby allowing American and multinational corporations to dominate Iraq's economy.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Whyte |first1=Dave |title=The Crimes of Neo-Liberal Rule in Occupied Iraq |journal=The British Journal of Criminology |date=March 2007 |volume=49 |issue=2 |pages=177–195 |doi=10.1093/bjc/azl065 |url=https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/47/2/177/519163 |access-date=18 March 2022|doi-access=free }}</ref> Others argue the CPA considered free market reform essential for Iraq's oil wealth to generate sustainable growth and development, instead of consigning Iraq to a [[Resource curse|resource trap]] by maintaining the laws of the previous totalitarian regime.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Henderson |first1=Anne Ellen |title=The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Learned |date=April 2005 |publisher=United States Institute of Peace |location=1200 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 |page=3 |url=https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr138.pdf |access-date=18 March 2022}}</ref>

[[CPA Order 17]] granted all foreign contractors operating in Iraq [[Immunity from prosecution|immunity]] from "Iraqi [[legal process]]," effectively granting immunity from any kind of suit, civil or criminal, for actions the contractors engaged in within Iraq.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20040701202703/http://iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf iraqcoalition.org/~Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with_Annex_A.pdf]. (PDF) .</ref> CPA Order 49 provided a tax cut for corporations operating within Iraq. It reduced the rate from a maximum of 40% to a maximum of 15% on income. Corporations working with the CPA were exempted from owing any tax.<ref>[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040220_CPAORD_49_Tax_Strategy_of_2004_with_Annex_and_Ex_Note.pdf iraqcoalition.org/~Tax_Strategy_of_2004_with_Annex_and_Ex_Note.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303165636/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040220_CPAORD_49_Tax_Strategy_of_2004_with_Annex_and_Ex_Note.pdf |date=3 March 2016 }}. (PDF) .</ref> CPA Order 12, amended by Order 54, suspended all tariffs, thus removing the advantage that domestic Iraqi producers had over foreign producers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/CPAORD12.pdf|title=Account Suspended|website=www.iraqcoalition.org|access-date=9 June 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130924032048/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/CPAORD12.pdf|archive-date=24 September 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>[http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040404_CPAORD54_Trade_Liberlization_Policy_2004_with_Annex_A.pdf iraqcoalition.org/~Trade_Liberlization_Policy_2004_with_Annex_A.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303202604/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040404_CPAORD54_Trade_Liberlization_Policy_2004_with_Annex_A.pdf |date=3 March 2016 }}. (PDF) .</ref> However, a 5% "reconstruction levy" on all imported goods was later reimposed to help finance Iraqi-initiated reconstruction projects.<ref>[http://www.trade.gov/iraq/ Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160918072314/http://www.trade.gov/iraq/ |date=18 September 2016 }}. Trade.gov.</ref>

[[100 Orders|CPA Order 57]] provided for the appointment of "Inspectors General" to operate within each Iraqi government ministry, for the purposes of rooting out corruption. These Inspectors General were to be "appointed to a 5-year term by the Administrator [Paul Bremer]," and were given sweeping powers "to conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, inspections, and other reviews...."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040212_CPAORD57.pdf|title=Account Suspended|website=www.iraqcoalition.org|access-date=1 July 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050628222602/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040212_CPAORD57.pdf|archive-date=28 June 2005|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Critics contend this is a mechanism for ensuring continuing American influence in Iraqi governance even after the transfer of all [[sovereignty]] to the country.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Richards |first1=Imogen |title=Neoliberalism and neo-jihadism: Propaganda and finance in Al Qaeda and Islamic State |date=2020 |publisher=Manchester University Press |isbn=978-1526143228}}</ref>

=== Legitimacy under international law ===

Critics contend that the controversial policies are fundamentally anti-democratic, or illegal under international law,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/07/iraq.comment|title=Pillage is forbidden|last=Mate|first=Aaron|date=7 November 2003|website=the Guardian|language=en|access-date=20 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180321192614/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/07/iraq.comment|archive-date=21 March 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> because significant economic reform can only be legitimate if passed initially by an elected Iraqi government free of foreign occupation and domination,<ref>[http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=5916 WAR: TRADE BY OTHER MEANS: How the US is getting a free trade agreement minus the negotiations] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929122753/http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=5916 |date=29 September 2007 }}. Zmag.org.</ref> and because an occupying power is prohibited from rewriting the laws of the occupied country.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/089/2003/en/ |title=Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying powers |date=15 April 2003 |access-date=21 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181122061406/https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/089/2003/en/ |archive-date=22 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>

The CPA argued that imposing Order 39 was permitted under Resolution 1483,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ho |first1=James C |title=International law and the Liberation of Iraq |journal=Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. |date=2003 |volume=79 |issue=83}}</ref> because it required the CPA to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory," and to create "conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future."<ref>{{cite web |title=Resolution 1483 |url=http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1483 |website=United Nations Security Council |access-date=18 March 2022 |date=22 May 2003}}</ref> Proponents of this position state Resolution 1483 necessarily requires radical economic restructuring, so it allowed an exception to international law regarding occupation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Grant |first1=Thomas D |title=Iraq: How to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reform |journal=ASIL Insight |date=June 2003}}</ref> However, others point out that Resolution 1483 "calls upon all concerned to comply with international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949",<ref>{{cite web |title=Resolution 1483 |url=http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1483 |website=United Nations Security Council |access-date=18 March 2022 |date=22 May 2003}}</ref> which would require an occupying force to respect the laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=ZWANENBURG |first1=MARTEN |title=Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the law of occupation |journal=International Review of the Red Cross |date=December 2004 |volume=86 |page=750 |url=https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_856.pdf |access-date=18 March 2022}}</ref>

== Criticism of financial management ==

{{Quote box
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 |source = -[[Henry Waxman]]<ref name="Pallister2007"/>
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In May 2003, the CPA took over the responsibility for administering the [[Development Fund for Iraq]] (DFI). Established from the earlier UN oil-for-food program, the CPA was authorized to manage the DFI, which took in approximately $20 billion in the year after the invasion. The CPA also administered $18.4 billion that the [[United States Congress]] allocated for Iraqi reconstruction in November 2003, known as the [[Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund]] (IRRF).
By June 2004, the CPA had spent, or allocated, $19.1 billion of the DFI funds—while spending only $400 million from the IRRF. Critics suggest that Bremer selectively spent from the DFI because it was more free from accounting oversight by the [[Government Accountability Office]] (GAO).

This balance between DFI and IRRF expenditures might be justifiable by the argument that the IRRF was not intended to finance the Iraqi government ministries or the Public Distribution System (state food rations from the Oil-for-food program), which the DFI was intended to cover. The $18.4 billion authorized by the U.S. congress was intended to finance large reconstruction projects such as power and sewage plants, not to provide the day-to-day operating expenses of the Iraqi government. Expenditure on the IRRF projects could be seen as delayed by the projects being in their planning and early site preparation stages and it could be said that it is not surprising that little money had been disbursed at that point, or that so much of the [[Development Fund for Iraq]] had been expended as that fund was the primary source of revenue the Iraqi government had. However, by reviewing reports from Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and other reviews and audits, it becomes clear that DFI funds were expended on projects that clearly would have been appropriate for management under IRRF. What has been troubling to auditors and inspectors general is that large amounts of DFI funding is as yet unaccounted for and was expended in reconstruction projects that failed to provide a return on investment for the Iraqi people. By funding projects under DFI the CPA avoided legal requirements to comply with US Federal Acquisition Regulations (USFARS) as required for the administration of IRRF and other US taxpayer provided funding. It is also pertinent that expenditures under IRRF were also not administered strictly according to USFARS thereby causing severe waste, fraud and abuse as documented by SIGIR and other auditing agencies.

===Audits of the CPA's expenditures of Iraqi funds===
{{wikisource|Contracts Awarded by the CPA}}
When authority to manage the revenue from Iraq's oil on behalf of the Iraqi people through [[United Nations resolution]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm|title=Resolution 1483|author=Administrator|access-date=6 July 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050708001515/http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm|archive-date=8 July 2005|url-status=live}}</ref> that authority was transferred under certain conditions.
* The funds were to be managed in an open, transparent fashion.
* The CPA was to submit to oversight from the [[International Advisory and Monitoring Board]], a blue ribbon panel of senior international banking experts.

The IAMB tried to insist on certain financial controls, with limited success.

With input from the IAMB accounting firm [[KPMG]] was appointed to [[KPMG audit of the Development Fund for Iraq|audit the CPA's expenditures from the DFI]].<ref>[http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/r052203a.pdf Development Fund for Iraq Statement of Cash Receipts and Payments For the period from 22 May 2003 to 31 December 2003 (with Independent Auditors' Report)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051017142403/http://www.iamb.info/auditrep/r052203a.pdf |date=17 October 2005 }}. (PDF) .</ref>

On 20 June 2005 the staff of the Committee on Government Reform prepared a report for Congressman [[Henry Waxman]] on the CPA's expenditures from the DFI that raised additional causes for concern.<ref name="Waxman2005">{{cite web |url=http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/story.asp?ID=873&Issue=Iraq+Reconstruction |title=U.S. Mismanaged Iraqi Funds |work=[[United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]] |access-date=8 February 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061227183442/http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/story.asp?ID=873&Issue=Iraq+Reconstruction |archive-date=27 December 2006}}</ref> Further criticism was leveled at the CPA when it was revealed that $12 billion of cash had been delivered by [[C-130 Hercules|C-130 plane]]s on shrinkwrapped [[pallet]]s of $100 bills.<ref name="Pallister2007">{{cite news |date=8 February 2007 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2008189,00.html |title=How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq. And watched it vanish |work=The Guardian|access-date=8 February 2007 |author=[[David Pallister]] |location=London}}</ref> The cash deliveries were described in a memo prepared for the [[United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform]], which concluded that "Many of the funds appear to have been lost to corruption and waste.... Some of the funds could have enriched both criminals and insurgents...." Henry Waxman, the chair of the House committee commented, "Who in their right mind would send 363 tons of cash into a war zone?" A single flight to Iraq on 12 December 2003 which contained $1.5 billion in cash is said to be the largest single Federal Reserve payout in US history according to Henry Waxman.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article720217.ece|title=How US lost billions in Wild West gamble to rebuild Iraq - Times Online|work=[[The Times]]|access-date=16 April 2011|location=London|first=Sadie|last=Gray|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080218050143/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article720217.ece|archive-date=18 February 2008|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In 2011, a new American audit found that almost all of the missing $6.6 billion had been transferred to the [[Central Bank of Iraq]]. [[Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction]] [[Stuart Bowen]] said that "Any doubts about how the money was handled after it left U.S. control is an Iraqi -- not U.S. government -- question".<ref>[http://dinarrvnews.blogspot.com/p/iraq-wars-missing-66-billion-is.html "Iraq War’s ’Missing’ $6.6 Billion Is Discovered in Central Bank."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161202235814/http://dinarrvnews.blogspot.com/p/iraq-wars-missing-66-billion-is.html |date=2 December 2016 }} ''Bloomberg News'', 26 October 2011.</ref>

== Reconstruction ==
[[File:Proposed flag of Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004).svg|thumb|200px|right|New [[Flag of Iraq|Iraqi flag]] proposed by the Iraqi Governing Council in 2004. It was abandoned after widespread criticism that its colors and motifs resembled those of the [[flag of Israel]] too closely.]]
{{main|Investment in post-invasion Iraq{{!}}Reconstruction of Iraq}}

Although the CPA awarded contracts for essential reconstruction to American firms, some critics claim those firms did relatively little work. [[Bechtel Corporation|Bechtel]], for instance, was awarded the contract to repair the Iraqi [[sewage]] and drinking water plants. Yet today{{when| date= May 2017}} many Iraqis remain without safe drinking water or adequate supplies of electricity.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.unicef.org/wash/iraq_43232.html|title=Iraq's water and sanitation crisis adds to dangers faced by children and families|website=UNICEF|access-date=28 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190301074442/https://www.unicef.org/wash/iraq_43232.html|archive-date=1 March 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Coalition military forces were too heavily tasked to provide requisite security for all contractors in Iraq. Contract funds therefore had to be partially shifted from reconstruction activities to meet security requirements that had not been envisioned when the contracts were initially let. Moreover, progress in reconstruction frequently faced setbacks due to insurgency activities designed to disrupt rebuilding of the infrastructure. This insurgent activity significantly slowed reconstruction and required adjustment of project goals due to funds consumed by providing necessary security in excess of that originally planned.

According to USAID, as of October 2003, peak electrical generation had reached pre-war levels of 4,500 MW, and they were then collaborating with Bechtel as well as the Iraqi Interior Ministry and others on some 2,000 MW of projected capacity. The CPA set a goal of 6,000 MW generation capacity for the summer of 2004, which has never been reached. Peak generation capacity of 5,365 MW was achieved in August 2004, six weeks after the transfer of sovereignty. Current generation stands at approximately 13,000 MW.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20050508094807/http://www.export.gov/Iraq/pdf/electrical.pdf About]. Export.gov.</ref> Weekly updates and financial summaries are provided by USAID's Iraq homepage as currently as is possible.<ref>[http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ Official website] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050628212425/http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ |date=28 June 2005 }}</ref>

== Administrators of the CPA ==
{{anchor|Administrators}}
*[[Jay Garner]] (21 April 2003 – 12 May 2003)<br />as Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
*[[Paul Bremer]] (12 May 2003 – 28 June 2004)
[[Richard Jones (U.S. diplomat)]], Deputy Administrator 
Rear Admiral David J. Nash, U.S. Navy (ret.), Director of the Program Management Office
Major General Ronald L. Johnson, U.S. Army, Deputy Director of the Program Management Office
Lawrence Crandall, U.S. Agency for International Development, Deputy Director of the Program Management Office
Stuart W. Bowen Jr., Inspector General of the Program Management Office
Rear Admiral Larry L. Poe, U.S. Navy (ret.), Deputy Inspector General of the Program Management Office

== See also ==
{{commons category|Coalition Provisional Authority}}
* [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483]]
* [[Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund]]
* [[Reconstruction of Iraq]]
* [[Provisional government]]s
* [[Development Fund for Iraq]]
* [[Coalition Provisional Authority Program Review Board]]
* [[International Advisory and Monitoring Board]]
* [[KPMG audit of the Development Fund for Iraq]]

== Notes ==
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{{reflist}}

==Further reading==

* [https://web.archive.org/web/20140220104657/http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.whoswho.html Who's Who in the Coalition Provisional Authority], ''[[The Washington Monthly]]'', December 2003.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100712083422/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ Coalition Provisional Authority] Archived site carrying CPA news releases, mission statements and budgets.
* [http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ USAID Assistance for Iraq Homepage] (See right column for weekly updates.)
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20160917051758/http://globalcurrencyreset.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Overview-of-CPA-Orders-Affecting-Iraqs-Commercial-Law.pdf Overview of CPA Orders Affecting Iraq's Commercial Law]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100309195638/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/budget/DFI_intro1.html Coalition Provisional Authority - Development Fund for Iraq Introduction], 12 July 2010.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060118065651/http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net/portal/page?_pageid=75%2C80077&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL Iraq Project and Contracting Office Website]
* [http://www.gjpi.org Global Justice Project: Iraq]
* [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/96bf686fe9704cd7c1256dba0036a96e Iraq's Economy Past, Present and Future] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061020155415/http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/96bf686fe9704cd7c1256dba0036a96e |date=20 October 2006 }}
* [https://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A61044-2003Sep24&notFound=true Crossed Wires Deprived Iraqis of Electric Power: War Plans Ignored Worn Infrastructure]{{dead link|date=September 2024|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}, ''[[The Washington Post]]'', 23 September 2003.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070219005251/http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz00t___.html Iraq - Transitional Administrative Law], an English translation of Iraq's Interim Constitution.
* [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/35/2956455.pdf#search='restrictions%20on%20foreign%20ownership%20WTO' Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in OECD Countries], an explanation of current common national practices regarding foreign direct investment and foreign ownership in OECD nations, including WTO regulations.
* [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law], OECD, 2004.
* [http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2004/0513usgrip.htm U.S. Tightens Grip On Iraq's Future]: the ''Wall St Journal'' on Iraq's looming "independence". (13 May 2004).
* [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48543-2004May22.html In Iraq, the Job Opportunity of a Lifetime: Managing a $13 Billion Budget With No Experience] ''The Washington Post'', 22 May 2004.
* [http://www.cfmconcepts.com/coalition-provisional-authority-u-s-officials-stuffed-cash-around-baghdad/ Boston Globe article that recounts questionable fiscal management on the part of the CPA] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161120003532/http://www.cfmconcepts.com/coalition-provisional-authority-u-s-officials-stuffed-cash-around-baghdad/ |date=20 November 2016 }}.
* [http://uslaboragainstwar.org/Article/4568/u-s-funds-for-iraq-are-largely-unspent U.S. Funds for Iraq Are Largely Unspent] ''The Washington Post'', 4 July 2004.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100309034236/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ A Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments] (to 30 June 2006).
* [http://globalcurrencyreset.net/iraq/coalition-politics-university-illinois/ Video Seminar on Iraq Coalition Politics]: 20 April 2005, sponsored by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050525203106/http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-lastdays20may20,0,2663283,print.story?coll=la-home-headlines Rules and Cash Flew Out the Window] ''Los Angeles Times'', 20 May 2005.
* [https://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20050605/wl_nm/iraq_economy_dc_1 Iraq too dependent on Oil Revenue - govt], Reuters, 5 June 2005.
* [http://www.iraqld.com/iraq/economy/iraqis-look-cuts-payroll/ Iraqis Look at Cuts in Payroll] ''Los Angeles Times'', 6 June 2005.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20061107115401/http://www.bechtel.com/iraq.htm Bechtel Iraq Reconstruction Contracts Page]
* [http://www.citizen.org/documents/bechteliniraq.pdf Bechtel's Dry Run (.pdf)], an independent review of the Bechtel water rehabilitation work.
* [https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1522983,00.html So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go?], ''The Guardian'', 7 July 2005.
* [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14044-2004Jul25.html U.S. Using Cash as a Defensive Weapon], ''The Washington Post'', 26 July 2004.
* [https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051212-4.html U.S. Presidential Discussion of War on Terror and Upcoming Iraqi Election], 12 December 2005.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20081003035422/http://www.sodaro.org/blog Tony Sodaro's "Iraqi Blog" after CPA, 03 October 2008]
* Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/16/AR2006091600193_pf.html Ties to GOP Trumped Know-How Among Staff Sent to Rebuild Iraq], ''The Washington Post'', 17 September 2006.
* [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/.../RAND_MG847.pdf Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority]{{dead link|date=August 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} The RAND Corporation, 2009. By James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, Sidd harth Mohandas.
* Rathmell, Andrew, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, eds. Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience. MG-365-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

== External links ==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20031103023830/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ Official Web Page of the Coalition Provisional Authority]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20040301034521/http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.html#Regulations CPA Changes to Iraqi Law imposed after 2003 invasion]
{{Iraq War}}
{{Iraqi governments}}
{{Iraq topics}}
{{United States topics}}

{{s-start}}
{{succession box
| before=[[Saddam Hussein]]<br />President
| title=[[President of Iraq|Presidency of Iraq]]
| years=9 April 2003 &ndash; 28 June 2004
| after=[[Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer]]<br />Interim President}}
{{succession box
| before=[[Saddam Hussein|Government of Saddam Hussein]]
| title=Government of Iraq |with =  [[Iraqi Governing Council]]
| years=21 April 2003 – 28 June 2004
| after=[[Iraqi Interim Government]]
}}
{{s-end}}

{{authority control}}

{{coord|33|20|N|44|23|E|type:country_source:kolossus-eswiki|display=title}}

[[Category:Coalition Provisional Authority| ]]
[[Category:United States Department of Defense agencies]]
[[Category:George W. Bush administration controversies]]
[[Category:Former regions and territories of the United States]]
[[Category:2003 establishments in Iraq]]
[[Category:2004 disestablishments in Iraq]]
[[Category:Provisional governments]]