Science and Security Policies (2020 DOE transition)
| Book 2 - Issue Papers
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| Entire 2020 DOE Transition book As of October 2020 |
Department Leadership has developed a series of policy initiatives to reduce the risk posed by specific threats, including threats by certain foreign governments, to the U.S. research enterprise, including the DOE National Laboratories. These policies were set out through a series of three leadership memos, the first of which was issued in April 2018, the second in December 2018, and the third in January 2019. The policies are implemented through a series of DOE Orders.
The key goal of these policies is to address risks to research security and integrity while maintaining an open, collaborative, world-leading science enterprise. Throughout the development and implementation of these policies, DOE has been actively engaging with the interagency Joint Committee on the Research Environment (JCORE) led by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
To take action on these issues, DOE created the Federal Oversight Advisory Body (FOAB), which is comprised of representatives identified by the Office of the Under Secretary of Energy, Under Secretary for Science, and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. The FOAB assists in implementing these polices, and formulates new policies as needed. The FOAB is co-chaired by these three representatives and has representatives from program offices that include, but are not limited to, the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; Office of International Affairs; and the Office of General Counsel.
Science and Security Policies
DOE has taken several concrete actions to mitigate the security risk at the national laboratories and throughout the DOE complex. These actions apply to international collaborations with countries of risk,[1] but allow continued and enhanced collaboration with countries that share U.S. core science values and principles.
Science and Technology Risk Matrix
The International Science & Technology Policy memo of December 2018 called for the establishment of a Science and Technology Risk Matrix. The purpose of the Matrix is to identify and put in place enhanced protections for critical and emerging research areas and technologies that are critical to U.S. economic and national security; global leadership; and competitiveness, and to mitigate against the detrimental exploitation of these research areas and technologies in ways that could harm the United States, and specifically the U.S. scientific enterprise.
The Matrix is comprised of emerging and critical research areas identified by the DOE science community that need protection from certain state-sponsored threat actors but are not otherwise protected by classified information and export controls. The Matrix places technologies into three color-coded risk categories – red, yellow, and green. Red is the most restrictive, and is limited in scope and narrowly defined. Collaboration with countries of risk in red technology areas requires specific approval by Departmental heads, granted through an exemption process. Yellow and green technology areas do not need to follow this exemption process prior to engagement.
The Chief Research Officers of the National Laboratory complex developed the Matrix by consensus at the request of DOE HQ. The Matrix is comprised of six initial emerging and critical research areas: Quantum Information Science, Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning, High Performance Computing, Accelerator Science, Battery Technologies, and Biotechnology.
The Science and Technology Risk Matrix was disseminated to the national laboratory complex and DOE program offices in December 2019 and will be updated, as needed, in coordination with the laboratories. It was implemented through a series of DOE Orders covering DOE sponsored foreign travel, agreements with national laboratories, and foreign national access to the national laboratories.[2]
DOE Order 486.1
Department of Energy Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs
In January 2019, DOE announced a policy prohibiting all DOE employees and contractors, including laboratory personnel, as well as DOE financial assistance recipients, from participating in foreign government talent recruitment programs sponsored by countries of risk. This policy for DOE employees and contractors, laboratory employees, and on-site research and development subcontractors was implemented in June 2019, but has not yet been implemented for financial assistance recipients as of October 2020.
The Order implementing this policy prohibits DOE employees and contractors from working in the DOE complex and participating in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries of risk. Its goal is to mitigate against the unauthorized transfer of science and technical information to foreign government entities through their participation in foreign government talent recruitment programs of countries of risk.
DOE has been in close coordination with other science agencies under the leadership of OSTP on developing any new requirements for financial assistance to ensure there are no conflicting requirements for institutions created once implemented. Specifically, DOE is working to ensure that the Department’s initiatives in these areas align with the recently issued National Strategy for Protecting Critical and Emerging Technologies (C&ET) and other proposed executive directives.
DOE Order 486.1A
Foreign Government Sponsored or Affiliated Activities
DOE expanded the scope of restricted activities[3] for DOE employees and contractors (including laboratory employees and on-site research & development contractors) in September 2020.
Restrictions on these activities do not strictly prohibit them, but employees and contractors must obtain an exemption in order to participate in these activities. This Order was implemented in October 2020.
Major Decisions/Events
Implementation of the foreign government talent recruitment program for FY 21 Financial Assistance Awards is pending and is expected to be completed calendar year 2020. Implementation of additional protection measures for financial assistance awards is pending.
References
- ↑ Foreign Country of Risk. Any foreign country determined to e of risk, following consideration of, but not limited to, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment and The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, by the Under Secretary for Science in consultation with the Under Secretary of Energy; the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security; and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. At this time, the countries of risk list is limited to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Each of the policies detailed only applies to countries of risk.
- ↑ DOE Order 550.1 Chg 1, Official Travel; DOE Policy 485.1A, Foreign Engagements with DOE National Laboratories; DOE Order 481.1E Chg 1, Strategic Partnership Projects; DOE Order 483.1B Chg 2, DOE Cooperative Research and Development Agreements; and DOE Order 142.3A, Unclassified Foreign Visitors and Assignments Program.
- ↑ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Strategy-for-CET.pdf