Executive Order 13920: Securing the United States Bulk-Power System (2020 Transition)

Book 2 - Issue Papers
Entire 2020 DOE Transition book As of October 2020

The bulk-power system (BPS) is the backbone of the United States (U.S.) electric grid, national security, and economy. Foreign adversaries continue to develop new ways to compromise the BPS, including undermining the supply chain of required critical components (per the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment and the 2020-2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy). To confront this increasingly sophisticated threat, President Trump signed Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” (the EO) on May 1, 2020, authorizing the Secretary of Energy—working with other Federal departments, agencies, and industry—to quickly and proactively protect the BPS. DOE’s Office of Electricity (OE) is the office leading the implementation of the EO. Successful implementation will be critical to ensure equipment used on the BPS is secure, both now and into the future.

The authorities established in the EO comprise four “pillars:”

• Pillar 1 Prohibition determinations for future procurements.
• Pillar 2 Criteria for pre-qualified equipment and vendors.
• Pillar 3 Mitigation of existing equipment and components already in the BPS.
• Pillar 4 Creation of a Task Force on Federal Energy Infrastructure Procurement Policies Related to National Security.

Status

The Department is taking a thoughtful, deliberate, phased approach that includes input from all stakeholders when implementing the four pillars of the EO. There are numerous lines of effort under each of the four pillars. Some activities have specific timelines whereas others will be longer term engagements where the effort will be dependent on a variety of factors, e.g., funding, equipment testing, support and engagement from DOE Program Offices and industry.

To better inform implementation of the EO and understand existing supply chain risk management practices across the stakeholder community, the Department published a Request for Information (RFI) in the Federal Register (FR) on July 8, 2020, with a 30-day public comment period ending on August 7, 2020. In response to several comments from stakeholders, the Department extended the RFI public comment period by an additional two weeks, and the comment period closed on August 24, 2020.

The RFI responses will be utilized in the ongoing rulemaking effort.

DOE Leadership and Coordination

• Since the EO was signed, OE’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance Division (TPTA) holds weekly meetings with OE leadership to discuss the EO implementation and discuss key policy decisions.
• TPTA meets on a regular basis with the Office of General Counsel, including weekly rulemaking development meetings with the core rulemaking team.
• DOE leadership, including the Office of the Secretary, is also regularly briefed by OE leadership.
• Updated information on the EO implementation is routinely posted to OE’s website: https://www.energy.gov/oe/bulkpowersystemexecutiveorder.
• The docket is being maintained on the Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&po=0&D=DOE-HQ-2020-0028.

Major Decisions/Events

• NOPR will be published in Federal Register with a 30-day public comment period.
• The EO Federal Task Force will be convened.
• BPS EO Final Rule will be published in Federal Register.

Background

The EO declares threats by foreign adversaries to the BPS constitute a national emergency. The EO was issued pursuant to the President’s authority under the Constitution and the laws of the U.S., including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, U.S. Code.

The BPS provides the electricity that supports the U.S. national defense, our vital emergency services, critical infrastructure, economy, and way of life. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) indicates near-peer foreign adversaries (e.g., China and Russia) possess highly advanced cyber programs and that both nations pose a major threat to the U.S. government, including, but not limited to, military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure. The BPS is a target of these adversaries’ asymmetric cyber and physical plans and operations. A successful attack on the BPS would present significant risks to the U.S. economy, and public health and safety and would render the U.S. less capable of acting in defense of itself and its allies. The Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy states the “homeland is no longer a sanctuary” and malicious cyber activity against personal, commercial, and government infrastructure is growing significantly.

According to ODNI’s 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,¹ and integrated plans necessary to launch cyber-attacks causing localized, disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as the disruption of a natural gas pipeline and electric infrastructure for days to weeks—in the U.S. These near-peer foreign adversaries continue to map U.S. critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being able to cause substantial damage. According to the 2020-2022 National Counterintelligence Strategy, ² these foreign adversaries are employing innovative combinations of traditional spying, economic espionage, and supply chain and cyber operations to gain access to critical infrastructure. They are also attempting to access our Nation’s key supply chains at multiple points—from concept to design, manufacture, integration, deployment, and maintenance—by, among other things, inserting malware into important information technology networks and communications systems.

The EO has four main pillars:

One

Prohibit any acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of BPS electric equipment by any person or with respect to any property to which a foreign adversary or an associated national thereof has any interest that poses an undue risk to the BPS; the security or resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure or the U.S. economy; or U.S. national security.

Two

Authorize the Secretary to establish and publish criteria for recognizing particular equipment and vendors in the BPS electric equipment market as “pre-qualified” for future transactions, and to apply these criteria to establish and publish a list of pre-qualified equipment and vendors.

Three

Direct the Secretary, in consultation with heads of other agencies, to identify existing BPS electric equipment in which a foreign adversary or associated national thereof has an interest that poses an undue risk to the BPS; the security or resiliency of U.S. critical infrastructure or the U.S. economy; or U.S. national security; and develop recommendations to identify, isolate, monitor, or replace this equipment as appropriate.

Four

Establish a Task Force on Federal Energy Infrastructure Procurement Policies Related to National Security, which will focus on the coordination of Federal Government procurement of energy infrastructure; the sharing of risk information and risk management practices; and the development of recommendations for implementation to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council).

The EO directs DOE, in consultation with the heads of several other agencies, to issue regulations implementing the authorities the President delegated to the Secretary of Energy.

The BPS is defined in the EO as:

• (i) facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and
• (ii) electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain transmission reliability

This definition includes transmission lines rated at 69,000 volts (69 kV) or more but does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.

The EO defines BPS electric equipment as items used in BPS substations, control rooms, or power generating stations, including reactors, capacitors, substation transformers, coupling capacitor potential devices [expressed in the E.O. as current coupling capacitors and coupling capacity voltage transformers], large generators, backup generators, substation voltage regulators, shunt capacitor equipment, automatic circuit reclosers, instrument transformers, protective relaying, metering equipment, high voltage circuit breakers, generation turbines, industrial control systems, distributed control systems, and safety instrumented systems. Items not included in the preceding list and that have broader application of use beyond the BPS are outside the scope.