DOE role in nuclear arms control negotiations (2020 DOE transition)
| Book 2 - Issue Papers
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| Entire 2020 DOE Transition book As of October 2020 |
DOE/NNSA role in nuclear arms control negotiations and implementation (2020 Presidential transition) is part of The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) support of the negotiation and implementation of nuclear arms control agreements.
The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) provides essential policy and technical support to the negotiation and implementation of nuclear arms control agreements. DOE/NNSA participates in the U.S. Government policy development process and in international negotiations for these agreements, ensuring DOE/NNSA interests and equities are represented and communicated. In addition, DOE/NNSA develops and evaluates policy options and technical capabilities to enable current and future monitoring and verification initiatives, and works with other NNSA elements, U.S. Government agencies, and international partners toward this end. This work is led through the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC), working closely with the Office of Defense Programs and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development.
Background
DOE/NNSA has a long history of providing critical support to the negotiation and implementation of nuclear arms control agreements and developing and evaluating technical capabilities for arms control verification. DOE/NNSA remains active in the ongoing U.S. interagency arms control policy development process, and has been heavily involved during the past six months in supporting high-level talks between the United States and Russia on a new agreement covering all nuclear warheads. DOE/NNSA arms control activities and responsibilities include the following:
New START Treaty
DOE/NNSA engages in policy development, negotiation, and implementation support, and compliance analysis for the New START Treaty. This includes representing DOE/NNSA in the U.S. interagency Backstopping Committee process and Verification and Compliance Analysis Working Group (VCAWG) and participating in the Treaty’s two annual Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) meetings.
Trilateral Arms Control/New START Treaty Follow-on
DOE/NNSA engages in policy development, negotiation support, and development and analysis of monitoring and verification measures, particularly with regard to technical measures that may be deployed at nuclear weapon production facilities to account for total nuclear warhead stockpiles. DOE/NNSA has participated in nearly all meetings with Russia on a new agreement since negotiations led by U.S. Ambassador Marshall Billingslea began in June 2020.
Nuclear Explosive Testing Limitations
DOE/NNSA engages in policy development and technical implementation for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and other nuclear explosion testing limitations. This includes representing DOE/NNSA in the U.S. Interagency Verification and Monitoring Task Force (VMTF) and providing technical support to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) and CTBT International Data Centre (IDC). It also includes oversight of technical projects that contribute to U.S. and international nuclear explosion monitoring capability.
Open Skies Treaty
DOE/NNSA engages in policy development, implementation, and compliance analysis, and works to ensure DOE/NNSA equities are represented within the U.S. interagency. [Note: On May 22, 2020, the United States submitted notice of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty due to ongoing Russian violations, and effective November 22, 2020, the United States will no longer be a party. In a press statement on May 21, 2020, Secretary of State Pompeo said the United States may reconsider its withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance.]
Future Monitoring and Verification Initiatives
DOE/NNSA engages in development, evaluation, and exercising of technical capabilities to enable current and potential future nuclear warhead monitoring and verification initiatives that balance operational and security considerations across the NNSA Enterprise. This includes oversight of technical projects across the National Laboratories, Plants, and Sites and work with other NNSA and U.S. Government elements as well as international partners.
Issue(s)
The New START Treaty expires on February 5, 2021, but may be extended up to an additional five years if both the United States and Russia agree. The United States has not made a decision regarding extension. Following three rounds of talks with the Russian Federation in Vienna, Austria, during the summer of 2020, the United States proposed a framework for a potential path forward on a follow on agreement to New START, which if agreed to, could facilitate an interim extension of the current agreement. The United States indicated that any extension is conditional upon: (1) serious engagement on a new agreement covering and accounting for all nuclear warheads; (2) China joining the United States and Russia in a future trilateral agreement; and (3) improvements to New START verification requirements regarding the number of inspections, the timing of inspection notifications, and the exchange of telemetric information. While the United States assesses that Russia is complying with the New START Treaty, it possesses large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and is developing new kinds of strategic offensive nuclear weapons systems. Russian NSNW and some of their new kinds of strategic offensive arms are not subject to New START’s limits and, therefore, pose an unconstrained threat to U.S. national security.
Status
Russia has publicly stated its interest in extending the New START Treaty but has rejected the most recent U.S. conditions. China has also called on the United States and Russia to extend New START while rejecting any calls to join talks for a trilateral nuclear arms control agreement. President Donald J. Trump has made clear that Russia and China must be brought into any future arms control agreement, and the Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Marshall Billingslea, has been regularly conveying this message during the past six months.
Milestone(s)
The United States has not made a decision regarding New START extension, but has tied a decision to extend the Treaty to progress toward a new arms control agreement that includes accounting for, and potentially limiting, total numbers of all nuclear warheads. If the President decides to extend the current New START agreement, the U.S. process for extension can move quickly as Congressional approval is not required . Russia has indicated that its domestic process will take more time, as the State Duma must agree, though it is generally believed that this would happen quickly if President Vladimir Putin so decided. New START does not include a date by which the sides must reach agreement on extension, so agreement can be reached any time prior to the Treaty’s expiration on February 5, 2021.