Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Difference between revisions

In May 2004, the [[National Security Archive]] released a highly classified review of INR's written analysis of the Vietnam War during the 1960s commissioned in 1969 by then-INR director [[Thomas L. Hughes]]. The INR written analysis was a 596 page study examining US decisions made during the Vietnam War. Some notable information within the review included pointing out the INR relied on circumstansial evidence to blame the North Vietnamese for maliciously attacking the US during the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/E-2.pdf|title=II - The Tonkin Gulf|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu|access-date=2024-05-01}}</ref> The review showed that INR had repeatedly warned of the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese Government and of the failing US strategy in Vietnam, and that, despite pressure from the military and Pentagon, INR had portrayed and projected the course of the war more accurately than any other source. That being said, there are instances within the review noting events the INR could not have predicted, one of the most infamous being the [[Tet Offensive]] in 1968; "Nothing, however... of the situation led INR to anticipate the scope or nature of the Tet Offensive."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/A-VI.pdf|title=VI - A Massive Effort to Turn the Tide: February 1966-April 1968|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu|access-date=2024-05-01}}</ref> Still, the majority of the INR's findings were accurate to the course of the war and highlighted the poor intelligence gathering of the CIA in comparison. An annex within the review was dedicated to critiquing the CIA's decision in intelligence gathering and the conflict the CIA had with the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB121/E-1.pdf|title=I - Infiltration|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu|access-date=2024-05-01}}</ref>