View source for Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

{{Organization
|OrganizationName=Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
|OrganizationType=Boards, Commissions, and Committees
|Mission=CFIUS reviews transactions involving foreign investment in the United States for national security concerns. It aims to protect U.S. interests by assessing the potential impact of such investments on national security and, if necessary, mitigating risks associated with these investments.
|CreationLegislation=Executive Order 11858 in 1975
|OrganizationExecutive=Secretary of the Treasury
|Services=National security review of foreign investments; Mitigation measures; Policy recommendations
|Regulations=Defense Production Act of 1950, Section 721; Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007; Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
|HeadquartersLocation=38.89761, -77.03435
|HeadquartersAddress=1500 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20005
}}
{{Short description|U.S. government agency}}

The '''Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States''' ('''CFIUS''') is an inter-agency committee in the [[Federal government of the United States|United States government]] that reviews the national security implications of foreign investments in the U.S. economy.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-01-25 |title=The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) |url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius |access-date=2024-01-30 |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |language=en}}</ref>

CFIUS' jurisdiction includes any transaction that could result in foreign control of a U.S. business, such as a merger, acquisition, or takeover; certain noncontrolling investments in businesses involved in critical technologies, infrastructure, or the handling of sensitive personal data; and certain real estate transactions. At CFIUS' recommendation, the [[President of the United States|President]] may suspend or prohibit transactions deemed threatening to U.S. national security.

CFIUS does not acknowledge which deals are under review nor require the involvement of any of relevant parties.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html|title=Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals|first=Kevin|last=Granville|date=March 5, 2018|access-date=April 1, 2019|work=The New York Times|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331220631/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html|archive-date=March 31, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> It utilizes classified information from the [[United States Intelligence Community|U.S. Intelligence Community]] and does not publicly announce its findings. There is no statute of limitations for CFIUS to exert jurisdiction over a transaction.<ref name=":0" /> Companies and/or individuals that have failed to make an appropriate filing for their transactions, whether ongoing or complete, may sustain a penalty in certain circumstances; additionally, the foreign party may be forced to divest.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/cfius-builds-on-2022-activity-promising-more-investor-oversight | title=CFIUS Builds on 2022 Activity, Promising More Investor Oversight | access-date=March 13, 2023 | archive-date=March 13, 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230313154455/https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/cfius-builds-on-2022-activity-promising-more-investor-oversight | url-status=live }}</ref>

== Organization ==
CFIUS is chaired by the [[United States Secretary of the Treasury|U.S. Secretary of the Treasury]] and includes representatives from 16 [[United States federal executive departments|federal executive departments and agencies]], including

* [[Department of Defense]]
* [[Department of State]]
* [[Department of Commerce]]
* [[Department of Homeland Security]]. 

Additionally, certain [[White House Office of the Staff Secretary|White House offices]] observe and participate as needed, such as

* [[Office of Management & Budget]]
* [[Council of Economic Advisers]]
* [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]]
* [[United States Homeland Security Council|Homeland Security Council]]
* [[National Economic Council (United States)|National Economic Council]].<ref>[https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-overview#:~:text=The%20members%20of%20CFIUS%20include,Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security "CFIUS Overview | U.S. Department of the Treasury"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330200017/https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-overview#:~:text=The%20members%20of%20CFIUS%20include,Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security|date=March 30, 2023}} </ref>

== History ==
CFIUS was established in 1975 by President [[Gerald Ford]]'s {{Executive Order|11858}}, pursuant to Section 721 of the [[Defense Production Act]], initially to study and provide policy recommendations regarding foreign investment. Subsequent fears of Japanese investment[[Fujitsu|—]]<nowiki/>particularly a proposed purchase of [[Fairchild Semiconductor]] by [[Fujitsu]]—led Congress to pass the [[Exon–Florio Amendment]] in 1988, which empowered the President to reject deals pursuant to a review by CFIUS. The committee was granted formal statutory authority by the [[Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007]] and further strengthened in 2018 by the Foreign Investment Risk Review and Modernization Act.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Summary of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 |url=https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Summary-of-FIRRMA.pdf |access-date=October 15, 2024 |website=[[United States Department of the Treasury]]}}</ref>

==Process==
CFIUS is legally authorized to investigate and review transactions involving foreign investment and/or real estate transactions by foreign persons and/or entities in the United States.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Richardson |first1=Jeffrey |title=A Modern Approach to Tackling CFIUS Concerns |url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/modern-approach-tackling-cfius-concerns |url-status=live |journal=Transaction Advisors |issn=2329-9134 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304200540/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/modern-approach-tackling-cfius-concerns |archive-date=March 4, 2016 |access-date=July 21, 2015}}</ref> CFIUS' primary concern in most reviews is that technology or funds from an acquired U.S. business might be transferred to a sanctioned country through its acquisition by the foreign party;<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schlager |first1=Ivan |last2=Beahn |first2=John |last3=Gafni |first3=Jonathan |last4=Tuesley |first4=Malcolm |last5=Gruenspecht |first5=Joshua |last6=Kabealo |first6=John |title=Implications of National Security Reviews on Foreign Acquisitions of US Businesses |url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/implications-national-security-reviews-foreign-acquisitions-us-businesses |url-status=live |journal=Transaction Advisors |issn=2329-9134 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304064205/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/implications-national-security-reviews-foreign-acquisitions-us-businesses |archive-date=March 4, 2016 |access-date=April 29, 2015}}</ref> close scrutiny is particularly given to acquisitions of critical infrastructure, such as public health or telecommunications. CFIUS has investigated "restrictions on sale of advanced computers to any of a long list of foreign recipients, ranging from China to Iran",<ref>{{cite news | first=Wayne | last=Rash | title=Suppose IBM-Lenovo Deal Doesn't Happen | date=2005-01-24 | publisher=eWeek.com | url=http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1754093,00.asp | archive-url=https://archive.today/20130122152547/http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1754093,00.asp | url-status=dead | archive-date=January 22, 2013 }}</ref> including deals involving U.S. allies, such as the acquisition of [[United Defense]] by U.K. company [[BAE Systems]] in 2005. The vast majority of transactions submitted to CFIUS are approved without difficulty, but at least one deal involving an Israeli firm was cancelled once CFIUS began scrutinizing it.<ref>{{cite news | first=Ellen | last=McCarthy | page=A06 | title=Purchase by Israeli Firm Called Off | date=March 24, 2006 | newspaper=Washington Post | url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/23/AR2006032302382.html | access-date=September 20, 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171119235957/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/23/AR2006032302382.html | archive-date=November 19, 2017 | url-status=live }}</ref>

All companies proposing to be involved in an acquisition by a foreign firm are supposed to voluntarily notify CFIUS, although the committee may also unilaterally initiate a review, and maintains jurisdiction over "non-notified transactions" indefinitely, including those that have since been completed.<ref name=":0">[https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10177 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] (May 17, 2024), Congressional Research Service</ref> Upon notification, CFIUS has 45 days to authorize a transaction or begin a statutory investigation; if the latter is chosen, the committee has another 45 days to decide whether to permit the acquisition or order [[divestment]]. Most transactions submitted to CFIUS are approved within the initial 45-day period without the statutory investigation.<ref>{{cite web | author=Sills, Gay Hartwell | year=2006 | title=Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) | work=U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary International Affairs, Office of International Investment | url=http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/ | access-date=2006-03-26 | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060325064442/https://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/ | archive-date=2006-03-25 }}
</ref> However, in 2022, roughly 56% of the 286 cases submitted to CFIUS proceeded to investigation, compared to about 40% of the 114 submitted a decade earlier.<ref>{{cite web |author=Steptoe & Johnson LLP |date=January 13, 2014 |title=CFIUS Report: Significant Increase In Scuttled Deals |url=http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/285836/international+trade+investment/CFIUS+Report+Significant+Increase+In+Scuttled+Deals&email_access=on |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140201122923/http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/285836/international+trade+investment/CFIUS+Report+Significant+Increase+In+Scuttled+Deals%26email_access%3Don |archive-date=February 1, 2014 |access-date=January 20, 2014}}</ref> If more investigation is necessary beyond the statutory period, parties are asked to withdraw and refile.

CFIUS serves as an administrative body to refer and advise the president should the transaction need to be rejected or limited; the law only grants the president authority to ultimately reject or limit the transaction within a 15-day presidential review period based on CFIUS recommendation. If the president does not take any action or needs more information than the 15-day presidential review period can provide, CFIUS can extend the presidential review period to additional 15 days or continue its investigation within its current statutory period or reset the statutory period if parties withdraw and refile. The president cannot act on a CFIUS recommendation outside the presidential review period provided by law.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius | title=The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) | date=June 24, 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-excepted-foreign-states | title=CFIUS Excepted Foreign States | date=June 24, 2024 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section4565&num=0&edition=prelim | title=50 USC 4565: Authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers }}</ref><ref>https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33388 {{Bare URL inline|date=August 2024}}</ref> If CFIUS approves the transaction, the parties involved will receive a safe harbor with respect to that transaction being investigated provided no CFIUS regulations and any mitigation orders, conditions, or agreements imposed by CFIUS are violated. 

Civil penalties may result in up to $250,000 per violation or the value of the transaction, whichever is greater, on any persons and/or entities that willfully violated CFIUS regulations, and any mitigation orders, conditions, or agreements imposed by CFIUS. The actual penalties depend on CFIUS rules and the specifics of the violation.

== History ==
In 1975, President Ford created the committee by {{EO|11858}}.<ref>{{EO|11858}} of May 7, 1975, {{USFR|40|20263}}</ref><ref name="stats290-291">{{cite book|title=Overview and Compilation of U.S Trade Statues|volume=I|date=December 2010|author=United States House Committee on Ways and Means|pages=290–291|publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|Government Printing Office]]|isbn=978-0-16-087511-3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=epQXv23t84UC&pg=PA290|author-link=United States House Committee on Ways and Means|access-date=October 29, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170507211446/https://books.google.com/books?id=epQXv23t84UC&pg=PA290|archive-date=May 7, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> It was composed of the [[secretary of the treasury]] as the chairman, [[secretary of state]], [[United States Secretary of Defense|secretary of defense]], [[secretary of commerce]], the assistant to the president for economic affairs, and the executive director of the [[Council on Foreign Economic Policy]]. The executive order also stipulated that the committee would have "primary continuing responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United States, both direct and portfolio, and for coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such investment." In particular, CFIUS was directed to:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=James K. |title=The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) |date=July 3, 2018 |publisher=Congressional Research Service |location=Washington, DC |page=3 |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf |access-date=July 8, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180729093852/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf |archive-date=July 29, 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>
# arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and significant developments in foreign investments in the United States;
# provide guidance on arrangements with foreign governments for advance consultations on prospective major foreign governmental investments in the United States;
# review investments in the United States which, in the judgment of the committee, might have major implications for United States national interests; and
# consider proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to foreign investment as may appear necessary.

In 1980, President [[Jimmy Carter]] added the [[United States Trade Representative|United States trade representative]] and substituted the chairman of the [[Council of Economic Advisers]] for the executive director of the Council on International Economic Policy by {{EO|12188}}.<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>{{EO|12188}} of January 2, 1980, {{USFR|45|969}}</ref>

In 1988, the [[Exon–Florio Amendment]] was the result of national security concerns in Congress caused by the proposed purchase of [[Fairchild Semiconductor]] by [[Fujitsu]].<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, sec. 5021, {{USStatute|100|418|102|1425|1988|08|23}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|title=Cold Feet: Fujitsu drops its Fairchild bid|magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]|date=March 30, 1987|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963877,00.html|access-date=October 14, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111214174320/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963877,00.html|archive-date=December 14, 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Exon-Florio Amendment granted the president the authority to block proposed mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers that threaten national security.<ref name="stats290-291"/> In 1988, President [[Ronald Reagan]] added the [[United States Attorney General|attorney general]] and the [[director of the Office of Management and Budget]] by {{EO|12661}}.<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>{{EO|12661}} of December 27, 1988, {{USFR|54|779}}</ref> Reagan also delegated the review process to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States in the same executive order, utilizing the [[statutory law|statutory]] authority the [[U.S. Congress]] enacted to enable the president to review foreign investments, in the form of Exon-Florio Amendment.

In 1992, the [[Byrd Amendment]] required CFIUS to investigate proposed mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers where the acquirer is acting on behalf of a foreign government and affects national security.<ref name="stats290-291"/> In 1993, President [[Bill Clinton]] added the [[director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy]], the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|national security advisor]], and the assistant to the president for economic policy by {{EO|12860}}.<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>{{EO|12860}} of September 3, 1993, {{USFR|58|47201}}</ref> In 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] added the [[secretary of homeland security]] by {{EO|13286}}.<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>{{EO|13286}}, sec. 57, of February 28, 2003</ref>

The [[Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007]] (FINSA) established the committee by statutory authority, reduced membership to six cabinet members and the attorney general, added the [[secretary of labor]] and the [[director of national intelligence]], and removed seven White House appointees.<ref name="stats290-291"/> In 2008, President Bush added the [[United States Trade Representative|United States trade representative]] and the [[director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy]] by {{EO|13456}} implementing the law.<ref name="stats290-291"/><ref>{{EO|13456}} of January 23, 2008</ref> FINSA requires the president to conduct a national security investigation of certain proposed investment transactions, provides a broader oversight role for Congress, and keeps the president as the only officer with the authority to suspend or prohibit mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.<ref name="stats290-291"/>

In 2018, President [[Donald Trump]] signed the [[Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act]] (FIRRMA), which granted CFIUS new powers over particular types of FDI that mainly concern Chinese investors.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/business/us-china-investment-cfius.html|title=In New Slap at China, U.S. Expands Power to Block Foreign Investments|last=Rappeport|first=Alan|date=October 10, 2018|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=December 31, 2019|url-status=live|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200104060440/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/business/us-china-investment-cfius.html|archive-date=January 4, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/business/foreign-investment-united-states.html|title=Congress Strengthens Reviews of Chinese and Other Foreign Investments|last=Yoon-Hendricks|first=Alexandra|date=August 1, 2018|work=The New York Times|access-date=December 31, 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191001193542/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/business/foreign-investment-united-states.html|archive-date=October 1, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> These include [[real estate investing]], minority investments through [[private equity]] that provide access to U.S. tech companies' [[trade secret|business information]], and U.S.-Chinese [[joint venture]]s. CFIUS also gained more [[Appropriation (law)|appropriations]], staffing, authority to enforce a longer review period, and formalizes more thorough material agreement disclosure.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-reform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry|title=CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for Industry|first1=Farhad|last1=Jalinous|first2=Karalyn|last2=Mildorf|first3=Keith|last3=Schomig|publisher=White & Case|date=August 13, 2018|access-date=April 1, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401170116/https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-reform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry|archive-date=April 1, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Trump's successor, President [[Joe Biden]] signed an executive order in September 2022 directing CFIUS to sharpen its scrutiny of foreign investment that could impact cyber security, quantum computing, biotechnology, and sensitive data.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Alper |first1=Alexandra |last2=Holland |first2=Steve |date=2022-09-15 |title=Biden tells foreign investment panel to screen deals for data, cyber risks |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-tells-foreign-investment-panel-screen-deals-data-cyber-risks-2022-09-15/ |access-date=2022-09-16 |archive-date=September 16, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220916004346/https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-tells-foreign-investment-panel-screen-deals-data-cyber-risks-2022-09-15/ |url-status=live }}</ref> 

CFIUS has gained greater importance within the U.S. national security apparatus, primarily in the context of the [[China–United States trade war|ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China]]. The ''New York Times'' described the Committee as "powerful and unseen", observing its power to "kill the biggest multibillion-dollar global deals".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Granville |first=Kevin |date=2018-03-05 |title=Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331220631/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html |archive-date=March 31, 2019 |access-date=2023-01-31 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The number of deals reviewed by CFIUS has increased markedly since 2018,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ho |first=Justin |date=2024-05-07 |title=Why the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. is busier |url=https://www.marketplace.org/2024/05/07/why-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-is-busier-cfius/ |access-date=2024-07-17 |website=Marketplace |language=en-US}}</ref> as have the number of unilateral inquiries of non-notified deals.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fingar |first=Courtney |title=With TikTok Bill Stalled, Treasury Seeks To Tighten CFIUS Enforcement |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/courtneyfingar/2024/04/16/treasury-department-looks-to-toughen-up-cfius-enforcement/ |access-date=2024-07-17 |website=Forbes |language=en}}</ref>

== Reception ==
Press reports have repeatedly criticized CFIUS for its secrecy, referring to the Committee's investigations as a "black box."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-10-21 |title=All About CFIUS, the Watchdog Biden May Use to Review Musk's Ventures |language=en |work=Bloomberg.com |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-21/all-about-cfius-us-watchdog-on-foreign-dealmaking-quicktake-l9ivzn5i |access-date=2023-01-31}}</ref> Advocates for its current level of confidentiality argue that there are few alternatives, as CFIUS' work is based on classified national security information, which cannot be disclosed to the public.<ref>[https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Confidentiality.pdf CFIUS Confidentiality], Office of Investment Security, U.S. Department of the Treasury</ref> 

In February 2006, prior to the implementation of two major regulatory expansions (FINSA, 2007; FIRRMA, 2018), [[Richard Perle]]—a neoconservative in the Bush Administration's Department of Defense that falsely alleged an Iraqi WMD program—gave his opinion on CFIUS when he related to [[CBS News]] his experience with the panel during the Reagan administration: "The committee almost never met, and when it deliberated it was usually at a fairly low bureaucratic level."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Conway |first=Patrick |date=August 2012 |title=Red Team: How the Neoconservatives Helped Cause the Iraq Intelligence Failure |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2012.688304 |journal=Intelligence and National Security |language=en |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=488–512 |doi=10.1080/02684527.2012.688304 |issn=0268-4527}}</ref> However, expansions in power and heightened public interest in foreign direct investment since 2006 have reportedly required significantly elevated input from senior U.S. government officials across CFIUS agencies, reaching the highest tiers of government. <ref>{{cite news | title=Bush, Congress In Dark About Port Deal | date=2006-02-22 | work=[[CBS News]] | url=http://cbs4denver.com/national/topstories_story_053102937.html | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060310080155/http://cbs4denver.com/national/topstories_story_053102937.html | archive-date=March 10, 2006 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Matthews|first1=Chris|title=Bush kep in the dark about ports deal|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna11521239|access-date=29 July 2017|publisher=MSNBC|date=February 23, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729220722/http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11521239/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/bush-kept-dark-about-ports-deal/#.WXzEn4grKM8|archive-date=July 29, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

Others emphasize the crucial role that [[foreign direct investment]] plays in the U.S. economy, and the discouraging effect that heightened scrutiny may cause. Foreign investors in the United States, much like U.S. investors elsewhere, bring expertise and infusions of capital into often-struggling sectors of the U.S. economy. In a February 2006 interview with the ''New York Times'', another former Reagan administration official, [[Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr.]], noted that the United States "need[s] a net inflow of capital of $3 billion a day to keep the economy afloat.&nbsp;... Yet all of the body language here is 'go away.{{'"}}<ref>{{cite news | first=Eduardo | last=Porter | title=Dubai Deal's Collapse Prompts Fears Abroad on Trade With U.S. | date=March 10, 2006 | work=The New York Times | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/business/worldbusiness/10chill.html | access-date=February 21, 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140111134132/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/business/worldbusiness/10chill.html | archive-date=January 11, 2014 | url-status=live }} (free registration required to access content)</ref>

==Notable cases==
* 1990: President [[George H. W. Bush]] voided the sale of MAMCO Manufacturing to a Chinese agency, ordering [[China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation]] to divest themselves of [[Seattle]]-based MAMCO<ref>{{cite web | title= Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated | url= http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/90020112.html | first= George | last= Bush | author-link= George H. W. Bush | publisher= [[Federation of American Scientists]] | date= February 1, 1990 | access-date= September 28, 2012 | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20140427024809/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/contractor/90020112.html | archive-date= April 27, 2014 | url-status= live }}</ref>
* 2000: Japanese [[NTT Communications]]' acquisition of [[Verio]]<ref>{{Cite web |date=2000-08-24 |title=No National Security Threat Seen in NTT's Proposed Purchase of Verio |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-aug-24-fi-9539-story.html |access-date=2024-10-15 |website=Los Angeles Times |language=en-US}}</ref>
* 2005: The acquisition of [[IBM]]'s personal computer and laptop unit by [[Lenovo]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lohr |first=Steve |date=January 31, 2005 |title=Is I.B.M.'s Lenovo Proposal a Threat to National Security? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/31/technology/is-ibms-lenovo-proposal-a-threat-to-national-security.html |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>
* 2005: The acquisition of [[Sequoia Voting Systems]] of [[Oakland, California]], by [[Smartmatic]], a Dutch company contracted by [[Hugo Chávez]]'s government to replace that country's elections machinery<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/us/politics/31vote.html | work=The New York Times | title=Voting Machine Company Submits to Inquiry | first=Tim | last=Golden | date=October 31, 2006 | access-date=April 30, 2010 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161023000629/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/us/politics/31vote.html | archive-date=October 23, 2016 | url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2005: In June 2005 a [[CNOOC Group]] (a major Chinese state-owned oil and gas corporation) subsidiary (CNOOC limited, publicly listed on the New York NYSE and Hong Kong stock exchanges) made an $18.5 billion cash offer for American oil company [[Unocal Corporation]], topping an earlier bid by [[ChevronTexaco]]. While this offer was not opposed by the CFIUS and the Bush Administration, it was criticized by several Congressmen and, following a vote in the United States House of Representatives, the bid was referred to President [[George W. Bush]], on the grounds that its implications for national security needed to be reviewed. On July 20, 2005, [[Unocal Corporation]] announced that it had accepted a buyout offer from [[ChevronTexaco]] for $17.1 billion, which was submitted to Unocal stockholders on August 10. On August 2, CNOOC Limited announced that it had withdrawn its bid, citing political tensions in the United States.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The CNOOC Case |url=https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3942/05iie3942.pdf |access-date=October 15, 2024 |website=[[Peterson Institute for International Economics]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Lohr |first=Steve |date=July 13, 2005 |title=Unocal Bid Opens Up New Issues of Security |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/business/worldbusiness/unocal-bid-opens-up-new-issues-of-security.html |access-date=October 15, 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>
* 2006: State-owned [[Dubai Ports World]]'s planned acquisition of [[Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company|P&O]], the lessee and operator of many terminals, mostly for container ships, in several ports, including in New York-New Jersey and others in the US. This acquisition was initially approved by CFIUS and then President G.W. Bush, but was eventually opposed by Congress ([[Dubai Ports World controversy]]).
* 2010: Russian interests acquired a controlling interest in [[Uranium One]], which has 20 percent of U.S. uranium extraction capacity.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Qiu|first1=Linda|title=Donald Trump inaccurately suggests Clinton got paid to approve Russia uranium deal|url=http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/30/donald-trump/donald-trump-inaccurately-suggests-clinton-got-pai/|access-date=July 29, 2017|publisher=Politifact|date=June 30, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170803112819/http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jun/30/donald-trump/donald-trump-inaccurately-suggests-clinton-got-pai/|archive-date=August 3, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> The Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the deal because Uranium One only has a license for uranium recovery, not uranium export.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2010/10-211.pdf|title=NRC Approves Transfer of Control of Uranium Recovery Licenses to Russian Firm|date=January 29, 2017|access-date=October 17, 2017|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170129043258/https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2010/10-211.pdf|archive-date=January 29, 2017}}</ref>  
* 2012: Ralls Corporation, owned by the Chinese [[Sany Group]],<ref>Banerjee, Neela, and Don Lee, [http://www.latimes.com/news/custom/la-na-china-wind-farms-20120929,0,5616624.story "Obama blocks Chinese firm's Oregon wind farm projects"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002144547/http://www.latimes.com/news/custom/la-na-china-wind-farms-20120929,0,5616624.story |date=October 2, 2012 }}, ''Los Angeles Times'', September 29, 2012. Retrieved October 2, 2012.</ref> was ordered by President [[Barack Obama]] to divest itself of four small [[wind farm]] projects located too close to a U.S. Navy weapons systems training facility in [[Boardman, Oregon]].<ref name="oreAP">{{cite news | title= Obama blocks Chinese purchase of small Oregon wind farm project | url= http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/09/oregon_wind_farm_purchase_by_c.html | agency= [[Associated Press]] | publisher= [[The Oregonian]] | date= September 28, 2012 | access-date= September 28, 2012 | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20121004041634/http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/09/oregon_wind_farm_purchase_by_c.html | archive-date= October 4, 2012 | url-status= live }}</ref>
* 2016: President Obama blocked the buying by a Chinese company of the U.S. assets of the German company Aixtron SE.<ref>{{cite news|last1=McLaughlin|first1=David|title=Obama Blocks Chinese Takeover of Aixtron as U.S. Security Risk|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-02/obama-blocks-chinese-takeover-of-aixtron-as-u-s-security-risk|access-date=February 27, 2017|work=[[Bloomberg News]]|date=December 2, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170202035712/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-02/obama-blocks-chinese-takeover-of-aixtron-as-u-s-security-risk|archive-date=February 2, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Separately, the ''New York Times'' reported that "United States officials blocked" a $2.6 billion deal by [[Philips]] to sell [[Lumileds]] division to GO Scale Capital and GRS Ventures over concerns regarding Chinese applications of [[gallium nitride]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Paul Mozur|last2=Jane Perlez|author2-link=Jane Perlez|title=Concern Grows in U.S. Over China's Drive to Make Chips|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/technology/concern-grows-in-us-over-chinas-drive-to-make-chips.html|access-date=February 27, 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=February 5, 2016|page=B1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170227090607/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/technology/concern-grows-in-us-over-chinas-drive-to-make-chips.html|archive-date=February 27, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>
* 2017: President Trump blocked the acquisition by a Chinese purchaser of [[Lattice Semiconductor]].<ref name="NYT-Lattice">{{cite news|last1=Swanson|first1=Ana|title=Trump Blocks China-Backed Bid to Buy U.S. Chip Maker|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html|access-date=December 4, 2017|work=The New York Times|date=September 13, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171211105159/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/trump-lattice-semiconductor-china.html|archive-date=December 11, 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>
* 2018: President Trump blocked Singapore-based [[Broadcom Limited]] from purchasing [[Qualcomm]] in a hostile takeover, citing national security concerns raised by CFIUS.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/trump-issues-order-to-block-broadcom-s-takeover-of-qualcomm-jeoszwnt|title=Trump Blocks Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm on Security Risks|date=March 12, 2018|work=Bloomberg.com|access-date=March 13, 2018|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180313000014/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/trump-issues-order-to-block-broadcom-s-takeover-of-qualcomm-jeoszwnt|archive-date=March 13, 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>
* 2019: CFIUS requested that Chinese gaming company Beijing Kunlun Tech Co Ltd. sell [[Grindr]], citing national security concerns regarding a database of user's location, messages, and HIV status, after the company acquired the gay dating app in two separate transactions in 2016 and 2018, both without CFIUS review.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-beijingkunlun/chinas-kunlun-tech-agrees-to-u-s-demand-to-sell-grindr-gay-dating-app-idUSKCN1SJ28N|title=China's Kunlun Tech agrees to U.S. demand to sell Grindr gay dating app|date=May 10, 2019|work=Reuters.com|access-date=November 25, 2019|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010210935/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-beijingkunlun/chinas-kunlun-tech-agrees-to-u-s-demand-to-sell-grindr-gay-dating-app-idUSKCN1SJ28N|archive-date=October 10, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=O'Donnell |first1=Carl |last2=Baker |first2=Liana B. |last3=Wang |first3=Echo |title=Exclusive: Told U.S. security at risk, Chinese firm seeks to sell Grindr dating app |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-pushes-chinese-owner-of-grindr-to-divest-the-dating-app-sources-idUSKCN1R809L/ |access-date=31 August 2024 |agency=Reuters |date=27 March 2019}}</ref> Kunlun sold Grindr for about $608.5 million in March 2020.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Peters |first1=Jay |title=Grindr has been sold by its Chinese owner after the US expressed security concerns |url=https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/6/21168079/grindr-sold-chinese-owner-us-cfius-security-concerns-kunlun-lgbtq |work=The Verge |date=6 March 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
* 2020: President Trump threatened to ban [[TikTok]] via International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergencies Act,<ref>{{cite web | url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/ | title=Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok – the White House | access-date=March 23, 2023 | archive-date=March 3, 2021 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303003031/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/ | url-status=live }}</ref> but in August declared a September 15 deadline for a sale to an American company. TikTok successfully challenged the ban via federal court, and the Biden administration asked to delay the government's appeal of a federal district court judge's December injunction against the TikTok ban as President Biden undertakes a broad review of his predecessor's efforts to address potential security risks from Chinese tech companies and to allow CFIUS to review TikTok via its previous 2017 acquisition of [[musical.ly]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/09/biden-revokes-and-replaces-trump-executive-orders-that-banned-tiktok.html | title=Biden revokes and replaces Trump executive orders that banned TikTok | website=[[CNBC]] | date=June 9, 2021 | access-date=March 23, 2023 | archive-date=March 23, 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323162836/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/09/biden-revokes-and-replaces-trump-executive-orders-that-banned-tiktok.html | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Leary |first1=John D. McKinnon and Alex |title=WSJ News Exclusive {{!}} TikTok Sale to Oracle, Walmart Is Shelved as Biden Reviews Security |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-to-oracle-walmart-is-shelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401?mod=article_inline |website=Wall Street Journal |date=10 February 2021 |access-date=April 20, 2021 |archive-date=April 20, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210420023513/https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-to-oracle-walmart-is-shelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401?mod=article_inline |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Notifications and investigations ==
{{Update|part=section|date=October 2021}}
''CFIUS Notifications and Investigations, 1988–2022''<ref>{{cite book| last = Graham| first = Edward M| author2 = David M. Marchick| title = US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment| publisher = Peterson Institute| date = May 2006| url = https://archive.org/details/usnationalsecuri00edwa/page/57| isbn = 978-0-88132-391-7| page = [https://archive.org/details/usnationalsecuri00edwa/page/57 57]| url-access = registration}}</ref><ref>CFIUS, [http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/Covered-Transactions_2006-2008.pdf "Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2006-2008"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090806235641/http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/Covered-Transactions_2006-2008.pdf |date=2009-08-06 }}, Accessed March 27, 2009.</ref><ref>CFIUS, [http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CoveredTransactions2008-2010.PDF "Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2008-2010"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120921021257/http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CoveredTransactions2008-2010.PDF |date=September 21, 2012 }}, Accessed August 25, 2011.</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Jackson |first1=James |title=The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf |access-date=1 November 2019 |issue=RL33388 |publisher=[[Congressional Research Service]] |date=October 23, 2019 |page=35 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180729093852/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf |archive-date=July 29, 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>CFIUS Annual Report to Congress, Calendar Year 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2018.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200611215446/https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2018.pdf |date=June 11, 2020 }} Accessed May 25, 2020</ref><ref>CFIUS Annual Report to Congress, Calendar Year 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-AnnualReporttoCongressCY2021.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221102120524/https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-AnnualReporttoCongressCY2021.pdf |date=November 2, 2022 }}, Accessed October 21, 2022.</ref><ref>https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS%20-%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress%20CY%202022_0.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=August 2024}}</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! Year
! Notifications
! Investigations
! Notices<br />withdrawn
! Presidential<br />decision
|-
|1988 ||14 ||1 ||0 ||1
|-
|1989 ||204 ||5 ||2 ||3
|-
|1990 ||295 ||6|| 2 ||4
|-
|1991|| 152|| 1|| 0 ||1
|-
|1992|| 106 ||2 ||1 ||1
|-
|1993 ||82 ||0|| 0 ||0
|-
|1994 ||69|| 0|| 0 ||0
|-
|1995 ||81|| 0|| 0 ||0
|-
|1996 ||55|| 0|| 0 ||0
|-
|1997 ||62|| 0|| 0 ||0
|-
|1998 ||65|| 2 ||2 ||0
|-
|1999 ||79|| 0|| 0 ||0
|-
|2000 ||72 ||1 ||0 ||1
|-
|2001 ||55 ||1 ||1 ||0
|-
|2002 ||43 ||0 ||0 ||0
|-
|2003|| 41 ||2 ||1 ||1
|-
|2004 ||53 ||2 ||2 ||0
|-
|2005 ||65|| 2|| 2 ||0
|-
|2006 ||111|| 7 || 19 || 2
|-
|2007 ||138|| 6 || 15 || 0
|-
|2008 ||155|| 23 || 23 || 0
|-
|2009 ||65|| 25 || 7 || 0
|-
|2010 ||93|| 35 || 12 || 0
|-
|2011 ||111|| 40 || 6 || 0
|-
|2012 ||114|| 45 || 22 || 1
|-
|2013 ||97|| 48 || 8 || 0
|-
|2014 ||147|| 51 || 12 || 0
|-
|2015 ||143|| 66 || 13 || 0
|-
|2016 ||172|| 79 || 21 || 1
|-
|2017 ||237 || 172 || 67 || 1
|-
|2018 ||229|| 158 || 64 || 1
|-
|2019 ||231 ||113 ||30 ||1
|-
|2020 ||187 ||88 ||29 ||1
|-
|2021 ||272 ||130 ||74 ||0
|-
|2022 ||286 ||162 ||87 ||0
|-
|}

==See also==
* [[Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations]]

==References==
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}

==External links==
{{Library resources box}}
* [https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius CFIUS page at US Treasury]

{{Presidency of Gerald Ford}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:United States federal boards, commissions, and committees]]
[[Category:United States trade policy]]
[[Category:1975 establishments in the United States]]
[[Category:Investment in the United States]]